The Role of International Election Observation Missions in Shaping Public Belief Post-Election

International election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention and the public’s belief about the quality of the election. Some developing countries bring in a number and variety of EOMs while other countries with authoritarian regimes bring in “friendly” monitors to counteract those monitoring the election. Their finding provides the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that competing verdicts post-election in 119 developing countries from 1990-2012.

Donno, Burcu Savun and Perisa Davutoglu, draw data on EOM verdicts that show governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the risk of criticism. International election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention and the public’s belief about the quality of the election. Some developing countries bring in a number and variety of EOMs while other countries with authoritarian regimes bring in “friendly” monitors to counteract those monitoring the election. Their finding provides the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that competing verdicts post-election in 119 developing countries from 1990-2012.

Donno, Burcu Savun and Perisa Davutoglu, draw data on EOM verdicts that show governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the risk of criticism. International election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention and the public’s belief about the quality of the election. Some developing countries bring in a number and variety of EOMs while other countries with authoritarian regimes bring in “friendly” monitors to counteract those monitoring the election. Their finding provides the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that competing verdicts post-election in 119 developing countries from 1990-2012.

Donno, Burcu Savun and Perisa Davutoglu, draw data on EOM verdicts that show governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the risk of criticism. International election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention and the public’s belief about the quality of the election. Some developing countries bring in a number and variety of EOMs while other countries with authoritarian regimes bring in “friendly” monitors to counteract those monitoring the election. Their finding provides the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that competing verdicts post-election in 119 developing countries from 1990-2012.

Donno, Burcu Savun and Perisa Davutoglu, draw data on EOM verdicts that show governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the risk of criticism. International election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention and the public’s belief about the quality of the election. Some developing countries bring in a number and variety of EOMs while other countries with authoritarian regimes bring in “friendly” monitors to counteract those monitoring the election. Their finding provides the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that competing verdicts post-election in 119 developing countries from 1990-2012.

Donno, Burcu Savun and Perisa Davutoglu, draw data on EOM verdicts that show governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the risk of criticism. International election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention and the public’s belief about the quality of the election. Some developing countries bring in a number and variety of EOMs while other countries with authoritarian regimes bring in “friendly” monitors to counteract those monitoring the election. Their finding provides the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that competing verdicts post-election in 119 developing countries from 1990-2012.

Donno, Burcu Savun and Perisa Davutoglu, draw data on EOM verdicts that show governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the risk of criticism. International election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention and the public’s belief about the quality of the election. Some developing countries bring in a number and variety of EOMs while other countries with authoritarian regimes bring in “friendly” monitors to counteract those monitoring the election. Their finding provides the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that competing verdicts post-election in 119 developing countries from 1990-2012.

Donno, Burcu Savun and Perisa Davutoglu, draw data on EOM verdicts that show governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the risk of criticism. International election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention and the public’s belief about the quality of the election. Some developing countries bring in a number and variety of EOMs while other countries with authoritarian regimes bring in “friendly” monitors to counteract those monitoring the election. Their finding provides the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that competing verdicts post-election in 119 developing countries from 1990-2012.

Donno, Burcu Savun and Perisa Davutoglu, draw data on EOM verdicts that show governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the risk of criticism. International election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention and the public’s belief about the quality of the election. Some developing countries bring in a number and variety of EOMs while other countries with authoritarian regimes bring in “friendly” monitors to counteract those monitoring the election. Their finding provides the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that competing verdicts post-election in 119 developing countries from 1990-2012.

Donno, Burcu Savun and Perisa Davutoglu, draw data on EOM verdicts that show governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the risk of criticism. International election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention and the public’s belief about the quality of the election. Some developing countries bring in a number and variety of EOMs while other countries with authoritarian regimes bring in “friendly” monitors to counteract those monitoring the election. Their finding provides the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that competing verdicts post-election in 119 developing countries from 1990-2012.