
Interview with Michael Hathaway

The interview was conducted by David Welborn in Washington, DC on July 8, 1993

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DW: First of all, Mr. Hathaway, thanks for coming by. I understand that this is a chaotic time in your life, changing the location of your office from one place to another. We're not quite on the street, which is a good thing given the weather, but we are in a relatively cool and comfortable hotel room. Let me ask you to tell a little bit about your background and the route you took to a staff position in the United States Senate.

MH: I started off as an aerospace engineer, worked at Huntsville, Alabama, on the Saturn Apollo project. I came back to Washington to start an electronics company when the space industry started going downhill and got involved in local politics. One of the people I became friends with was a Congressman from New Mexico, Manuel Luhan. We became good friends, and one day he mentioned he had been assigned to a task force on energy and resources in the House. The chairman was Jim McClure, Congressman from Idaho, and he understood Congressmen McClure was looking for an engineer to do this energy and resource study for two years. I went down and met with Congressman McClure, and we hit it off real well. He appointed me director of the House task force on energy and resources. At the end of the two years he had run for the Senate; he was going over and planned to continue his energy and resource work in the Senate. He asked me to come over in 1973 as his special assistant for energy and environment, which I was pleased to do. I also took over his Middle East work at that point, staffing it. About 1979, he made me his administrative assistant, after being legislative director for a couple of years. Then in 1980 he co-chaired with Dave Stockman the Reagan Congressional advisory committee on energy. I was staff director for the committee in the 1980 campaign. We did not expect to win the Senate in 1980; we were pleasantly surprised when we did. In 1981 when Senator McClure became chairman of the Energy Committee, he appointed me staff director of the Committee.

DW: How long did you remain as staff director?


DW: Then what did you do?

MH: I left the Hill, I had three boys to get through college. I left the Hill to start my own business as a consultant and lobbyist. I thought I'd be mostly in the energy field but found myself more and more in international trade and foreign [direct] investment, which was just starting to really become a major area of interest. I found it to be a very interesting field, very lucrative field. I came back to the Senate staff last year, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Senator Helms asked me to join the staff to do the October Surprise
investigation, which had been stuck in Foreign Relations. I agreed to come on for a short period of time to do that investigation. At the same time the BCCI investigation was added to that—well, it was not added to it but came under the Committee's jurisdiction. I was wrapping up the October Surprise investigation; a new staff director was appointed and had reorganized the Committee and asked me to take over as director of international economics and trade, which I was pleased to do. We set up a new operation to try to change some of the focus of that subcommittee—the new day in international trade and finance, the field was changing.

DW: So are you full-time back on the Foreign Relations Committee staff?

MH: No, I left there in December and went back into private practice; I've been in private work since that time. I'm working in some of the new republics, somewhat in Russia but more so in some of the other republics that have natural resource issues.

DW: That's very interesting. You came to the Senate in 1973 on McClure's staff; when did you first become aware that there was a Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee?

MH: I knew of Senator Baker during my work in the House, of course. In January 1973 Senator McClure was assigned to the Public Works Committee, now the Environmental Works Committee. He was ranking Republican on the economic development subcommittee; that was one of the big issues in the Nixon administration, economic development, trying to wipe the program out. Senator McClure was sort of the lead Republican in the Senate on the issue, but the issue was very close to Senator Baker so we worked very closely with Senator Baker on it. In February 1973 I accompanied Senator McClure and Senator Baker to the White House to meet with White House staff on the EDA bill. That was my first taste of the incredible arrogance and ignorance which seems to affect some people when they get into the White House! But I was very impressed with Senator Baker; he handled the issue and handled the delicate problem between the Senate and the White House. Sometimes the White House doesn't seem to understand that the Senate is an independent body, doesn't work for the White House. That was my first specific work with Senator Baker personally. Then later the Committee was reorganized, and the nuclear regulatory subcommittee was set up, and Senator McClure became ranking Republican on that. Of course, nuclear energy was one of Senator Baker's major interests, having served on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and with TVA and other issues. We worked very closely with Senator Baker on the nuclear issue.
DW: Who did you work with on Baker's staff on those matters?

MH: Jim Range, Jim was one of his key people on the Committee, who later when over with him in the leadership. I still see Jim, occasionally, he's working for Waste Management now. After the oil embargo of 1973 and the energy crisis, when we were all running around trying to figure out how to save energy, Senator McClure asked me for a list of ten items—"Just come up with ten things we could do to save energy." Some of them were quite politically unacceptable, but there was one in there—a national speed limit of 50 miles an hour. Senator McClure proposed that in a speech, and that got Senator Baker's attention, as well as many other Senators from more rural states. So Senator Dominici said 50 was too low, he wanted it to be 60. It finally got to a meeting in Senator Stafford's office, the ranking Republican on the Committee. Senator McClure was making his argument for 50, Senator Dominici was making his argument for 60. In came Senator Baker; he listened to both arguments and pointed out that both men were sound, there was no flaw in either argument, so he said the obvious thing was a compromise at 55. So that's how we got the 55 mile an hour speed limit.

DW: That was the origin of that—that's the first time I had heard that story, that's interesting. Can you generalize about the role Baker played on the Public Works Committee and his standing among his colleagues on the Committee?

MH: Yes, he was a key member. He was, of course, senior to Senator Stafford but since he was leadership he could not be ranking on that Committee. We were very fortunate that Senator Stafford and Senator Baker are both of the same gentlemen's school of politics. There was never any friction or clash there; they complemented each other. Baker's position in the leadership helped on the Public Works Committee. Senator McClure is also of that same school, the gentlemen's school, as with Senator Dominici, so the four of them together were able to work very effectively on several of the pretty serious issues we had, such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. They didn't always agree, of course, but I was always impressed at how they could get down into the guts of an issue and work together, each bringing their own power and strength and at the same time protecting their constituents.

DW: You are a person with a scientific background—comment on Baker's grasp of scientific and technical issues.
MH: On nuclear he was top-notch; he had really learned the nuclear energy business. On air pollution, he understood the scientific—we would have hearing and scientists would come in and just start rattling off all these numbers, and he stayed on top of that. Here again, he is a lawyer, and my boss was a lawyer, but both of them when they had to could think like engineers, which, coming from me, is a compliment!

DW: Even before Baker became minority leader, did he evidence leadership in the Public Works Committee context?

MH: Yes, keeping in mind that he was not the official ranking minority member of the Committee. I saw it in the other party, where a leadership Senator also had an important committee position, and it was a sort of constant battle between the chairman of the committee, when they were in power, and the leadership. It can be a very touchy ego clash, but Senator Baker managed to use his position in the leadership and work with Senator Stafford and the subcommittee ranking members. I don't recall any clashes or battles except the usual disagreements.

DW: You told the story of the 55 mile an hour speed limit a moment ago—was this typical of Baker's behavior when he was on the Committee? Even before he became the minority leader—in 1974, 1975, 1976—he was less an advocate of a particular position and more a process oriented person, trying to move things along.

MH: He did have a tendency to try to move the process along and work out the differences between people who felt very strongly about it, at the same time giving some of his own position up, but never that I can recall moving opposite to his position. In other words, he would continue down the path he wanted to go and bring the other people along with him. If it meant changing a few degrees one way or the other, he did that. He could soothe ruffled feathers and egos, which was probably one of his major weaknesses as majority leader, because he got to the point there where there are some people you can't be reasonable with, can't deal with, you just have to use the Lyndon Johnson or the Senator Byrd approach. If you try to continue being reasonable with them, it just wears you out and breaks you down.

DW: They just come back and try to take more and more advantage of you, is that what you're saying?
MH: They are never satisfied, and you can't trust them; it's like dealing with Adolf Hitler—not
the same type of person, but the same mentality: "Give me this and I will be happy," and
then that's --

DW: Talk a little bit about Baker's relationship with Senator Muskie as you saw it.

MH: They got along surprisingly well. Muskie could be a very difficult person. As I said, my
boss was a very easy person to work with, but there were times when he and Muskie would
go at it. The first time I ever heard him raise his voice was when Muskie was getting
particularly outrageous on some issue; we found out later was that Muskie's staff had misled
him about what we were trying to do. I'm trying to remember who was the ranking member
in that subcommittee.

DW: Before he became Republican leader, Baker was the ranking member of that subcommittee.

MH: Of the full committee.

DW: No, the subcommittee.

MH: Clean Air?

DW: Yes, Muskie's subcommittee.

MH: I didn't know that or I had forgotten it. He was a key player in the Clean Air Act. I guess
we didn't always agree or have the same position between McClure and Baker, but he could
take his position and work with Muskie. A lot of the changes in the bill were due to his
influence.

DW: Do you whether McClure supported him in the 1977 leadership race?

MH: I don't, I sure don't.

DW: Technically at any rate, you were operating out of McClure's office, you were not on the
Committee staff?
MH: I was personal staff.

DW: And you became AA in 1980?


DW: Which gave you a fairly close vantage point. What did Baker's minority leadership operation look like from that vantage point?

MH: Extremely smooth. I recall one meeting we had in his office; it was one of those days when you had fifteen things going at once and you couldn't keep anything straight and people were running around, frenzied. We walked in and there was Senator Baker, sitting at his—it wasn't a desk, it was a table—and there was nothing on the table except a pen. We came in with our particular crisis to be resolved, at which point his staff came in with another crisis and gave him the documents. He took the documents, the staff ran through points A-B-C-D and options 1-2-3-4, Senator Baker made a decision and gave it back to them. In the Senate, that's incredible. Then he proceeded, switched right away his focus to our crisis. He didn't always give you what you wanted or solve the problem, but he wasn't one of these, "Leave me the paper here on the desk, and I will look at it later" type of approach. On Capitol Hill, things move too fast for that, but it's quite often a way of "Well, I don't want to make a decision," or "I'm just going to put it aside here in the pile with everything else." But he didn't do that—he did something. Put it this way: it went somewhere else, which is really a good way for a Senator to operate.

DW: It's been said by some people that one of his major contributions as minority leader was to get Republicans in the Senate thinking of themselves as a potential majority.

MH: I had a problem with one of his efforts along that line. I had decided to run for Senate in 1980; my incumbent Senator was a good man, Charles "Mack" Matthias, one of the most decent, honorable men to ever serve in the Senate, but philosophically he was just out of synch with the party. So I decided to run against him in the primary. I was walking down the hall with Senator McClure and I mentioned to him that I might be leaving the staff to run. Senator McClure stopped dead and looked at me, and he told me about Senator Baker's initiative, which they had just approved the day before. To give you a little background on that, in 1978 we had two incumbent Republicans knocked off in the primary by conservative Republicans, Brooke and Case, and who later lost in the general. Senator
Baker had made the point to all the incumbent Republicans that we are too close to winning majority in 1982, we can't afford any more of this knocking off an incumbent who can win the state—knock him off in the primary but then lose in the general election. He had worked out an understanding, an agreement, that all the incumbents would support each other; if a liberal Republican incumbent was being challenged by a conservative, the conservatives would go in and support him—and vice versa—if a conservative was being challenged, the liberals would go in and support him. So Senator McClure said, "I would have to come in oppose you for Matthias!" So I thought, "Well, under those circumstances, the wise thing to do is stay here as your AA and work for the Republican majority." That was a brilliant, brilliant idea, and it paid off in 1982, because we had three weak incumbents up, all moderate to liberal Republicans. Following the Baker doctrine of 1980, all of us got behind them and helped re-elect all three of them to keep our majority in 1982.

DW: He also started, along about that same time or a little before, the weekly meeting with the ranking members. Do you have any reflections or observations on that which you garnered from Senator McClure?

MH: That was one of the better things he did, not just the meeting with the ranking members but his staff meeting with the ____ staff. We were always tied in to what was going on and what was happening; we didn't agree with it, we'd fight with it, an awful lot of the time we were fighting about the trees and forgetting about the forest. But that was his style, even when he was going to be doing something you didn't like, he would let you know. There was no blindsiding, he would try to bring you along as far as he could—if you can't work on this regard, work on that regard, that type of thing. That one-on-one touch, to me, was one of the major problems that the Democrats were having at the time. Their leadership had just gone off to be leadership; a lot of the junior Democrats just felt like they were on their own—so, OK, they would be on their own. Meeting with the Senator and his staff meeting with the staff really helped win in 1980.

DW: What kind of personal relationship did you develop with Baker?

MH: I remember the first time we went into his office in 1981, he had just become majority leader. One of his first acts was to invite all the new chairmen and their staff directors to his new office in the Capitol. We were all pleased and impressed. We filed in, and we were around this table; there was not enough room for the staff to sit, a lot of Senators, so each of us stood behind our chairman. Right behind me was a desk with a phone on it, and I leaned
back and hit the phone. Senator Baker said, "Mike, don't touch that phone!" I said, "Excuse me, sir?" He said, "That's the phone!" I said, "What do you mean, the phone?" He says, "That's the phone they call me on to tell me that the war has started and I'm to go to my evacuation point." And you know, I wasn't in this office fifteen minutes and that phone rang—I thought to myself, "Here I've become majority leader and the Russians have started World War III!" I picked it up, and it was some sergeant down in Virginia. I'm thinking, here he is, meeting with all the chairmen, he's the majority leader of the U.S. Senate, probably the most powerful number two man maybe in the world, at least the country, and he's sitting there relating this human event to me. Then in April that year he took a delegation of ten Senators, Democrats and Republicans, to the Middle East, and he invited Senator McClure and Senator Hatfield along and invited me along. I was very pleased to go, the Middle East is one of my areas in energy. On that trip he was just a human being. These trips can be very touchy, people can get their noses out of joint. At one point one of the staff was having trouble with their camera or something; he took time out and came over to explain the camera to him. It was a great trip, it did a lot. We came back, he had to be in his office on another matter, and he had this photograph, a beautiful photograph taken at night. I looked at it and said, "That looks like the old city of Jerusalem taken from the King David Hotel." He looked at me and said, "You recognize it." I said, "Look at the same room I had, two years before. But how did you get such a beautiful shot at night in Jerusalem?" He explained the techniques and I didn't think anything of it. Maybe about a week later, somebody came to my office with this beautiful framed enlargement of the photograph, autographed "To Mike Hathaway with highest respect and regards—Howard Baker." I've still got it hanging in my house.

DW: The point was that even before he became the majority leader he knew who you were and knew you in personal terms rather than just as another anonymous figure, a staff person who was around.

MH: I'd like to think so. You have to be careful with Senators or any politician, they have a real knack for making you think you're their closest friend, they've known you all your life and everything, when they haven't the slightest idea who you are. But in Senator Baker's case, it was genuine. Yes, we had worked six years, I'd worked with him and his staff on the Public Works Committee, we had worked on the nuclear energy issue, we had worked on the campaign in 1980. Yes, before he became majority leader, I'd say he knew who I was.
DW: Now I'm going to ask you the basic views question. In the policy areas that you were principally working in—energy, natural resources, the environment—what was his basic policy dispositions?

MH: With President Reagan's election and Dave Stockman's appointment to OMB and Governor [Edwards] coming up to be Secretary of Energy and Jim Watt to be Secretary of the Interior, the feeling was that energy and resource issues were no longer prime or top level, that we were going to get the government out of all these issues—the free market and private enterprise would take over and solve all these issues so it was no longer a real important issue. Senator McClure, of course, disagreed with that because he was closer to it. The very first bill that Reagan vetoed was Senator McClure's bill on a standby gasoline rationing program. Senator Baker came to Senator McClure—I was there on the floor the time that he did it—and just in his usual way told him, "Jim, this is President Reagan's first veto, and I'm going to support him. I'm going to work hard to get the votes. I understand what you're doing, we've talked about this before; I agree with what you're trying to do, but the President has made his decision, and I'm going to support the president in his first veto." He worked hard and helped turn votes away from his people who had supported the bill, voted to support the president. On the nuclear issue, he maintained his support there, because we had to come up with a nuclear waste legislation, it was one of our top priorities. There is no way the free market is going to take over the plutonium issue! Uranium enrichment, we can talk about. He had some influence with some of the more uninformed people in the administration on this issue, and we did get a nuclear waste bill through the Committee, which was supported; it passed the floor and the House, and the president did sign.

DW: Let me ask you a question associated with that. There was a little inner-Committee jurisdictional conflict in regard to working out that nuclear waste disposal bill, was there not?

MH: Yes. It wasn't just that particular bill; Dave Stockman was very anti-nuclear energy. He just didn't think nuclear energy should be around—period. One of the administration's promises had been to abolish the Energy Department, which we supported. The Energy Department and Department of Education should have been abolished. But what Stockman tried to do was to work with some of the other anti-nuclear people, both in the administration and in the Senate, not to abolish it so much but to transfer the nuclear energy portion of it to the Commerce Committee's jurisdiction where he would have more favorable Senators to work with on that issue and, of course, to the Public Works
Committee, which had the subcommittee on nuclear regulation. We suddenly realized that instead of abolishing the Energy Department, what we were into was a drive to attack nuclear energy by transferring both to Public Works and to Commerce. Senator McClure finally came in and just put his foot down and said, "I have no problem with abolishing the department, but we are not going to do this." He made it clear it was not a turf battle, this was an issue battle. Nuclear energy is a viable form of energy; it's got its problems, but gutting it is the wrong thing to do. Senator Baker supported him in that. As a matter of fact, we were outnumbered quite a bit as far as votes and support on the transfer of power. It was Senator Baker's support which finally killed the transfer.

DW: What did he do exactly?

MH: That's an interesting question. A lot of times he did things that we never figured out how he did it, which I think was one of his strengths. You were never quite sure if he had done something; you just assumed that this wouldn't have happened unless the majority leader wanted to happen. It was a very effective way to work on the Hill; don't put people in a corner—in this case he wanted to stop the jurisdiction from going to the Commerce Committee—don't go do open battle and then have the chairman of the Commerce Committee forced to defend his honor, whether he cared for the issue or not. I'm not sure, I assume he went to the chairman of the Commerce Committee and the chairman of the Public Works Committee and to the White House and explained the situation, and reason prevailed.

DW: The nuclear waste portion of the jurisdiction was to go to the Environment and Public Works, is that correct?

MH: Yes.

DW: And what was to go to Commerce? The rest of it?

MH: Nuclear R&D, the development. Stockman had this crazy idea—and Stockman knew better, but he had conned some people in the administration who didn't know better—that Commerce should have nuclear R&D and all nuclear energy work because its a commercial business thing and business should be involved with it, which was ludicrous.
DW: There were some other matters that I was going to ask you about, specific issues, and see what they prompted. You talked about giving the president rationing authority, which you said he didn't want, and where Baker came out on that. There was also a strategic reserve problem, was there not?

MH: Extremely—there was a major problem. That was something that had started and that we felt very strongly about. That's something you can't go wrong on—buy the oil, put it in the ground, it's not going to go down in value, it's not going to disappear, but it gives you that leverage. That's something else we had learned in our trips in the Middle East; quite a few of the more realistic or responsible Arabs were under pressure from the more radical, irresponsible Arabs along the lines, "You've got the Americans where you want them, put the pressure to them and make them do A-B-C." In effect, what the Arabs were telling us was, "The less leverage we have over you, the more we can resist this type of radical pressure. If you have a strategic petroleum reserve when the crazies come in and start demanding we do all these things, we can say, 'We have no leverage, they have a strategic petroleum reserve.'" But that was something that could not be publicized, for obvious reasons, so it wasn't an argument you could use politically. But we fought that and I'd say we prevailed, despite the opposition of people in the administration.

DW: Did Baker play a role in that?

MH: He played a role in everything. Quite often, what he would look for is whether there was somebody leading the charge on that issue, who he had confidence in and who he agreed with. If he did, then he could go off; you knew when you needed him he would be there, but he wasn't going to be there day by day. That's where the relationship between himself and Jim McClure worked so well. And Pete Dominici was a team player.

DW: That leads me to ask you to talk a little bit about the relationship between Senator Baker and Senator McClure.

MH: They came from similar backgrounds, they were lawyers, and they had worked their way up in politics. They had a feel for grassroots politics and practical politics; that gave them camaraderie. So many people coming into politics these days have no idea how politics works, they've seen too many movies or something. So that gave them a good basis; he had a lot of respect for how Senator McClure had handled himself as a junior minority Senator in 1973 to 1976. Quite often they were on opposite sides of the issue, but McClure had
handled himself well, and that impressed Senator Baker. He also realized that Senator McClure had an ability to go toe to toe with somebody, fight with them, and then no hard feelings later, which is a quality Senator Baker has and which he admires. The times you would see Baker get angry—to him anger was just tightening his jaw, I've never heard the man raise his voice, which is incredible—he'd tighten his jaw when somebody would let their personality or their ego become the primary issue. They no longer cared about A or B, but they had decided on A, therefore it was going to be A, and nobody was going to make it different. That type of thing, which goes on all the time, really offended him. Senator McClure was that kind, like Senator Dominici—and Senator Stafford, come to think of it. It's unique that those four men were put together in that time period, because they were so similar. Their ego was not the primary concern, they could take a loss or change or modify their position, which made them very effective in the nature of the Senate.

DW: When you came into the majority, McClure was chairman of the Republican Conference. Did you have any tie-ins with that part of the operation?

MH: I was fortunate in that in 1973 Senator McClure brought several more experienced staff—we were called old-timers by a lot of people, we were experienced people who had worked in the Goldwater campaign in 1964—he brought them onto the staff in different positions. As he moved up in different levels of responsibility, higher responsibility, he had people who he could take with him. One of my closest friends became staff director for the Conference.

DW: Margo Carlisle?

MH: Margo Carlisle, wonderful woman, fascinating. I'm very pleased to be close to her, I'd hate to be an enemy! She's one of the finest people you would ever meet in Washington. She ran the Conference; other people were able to move over to other positions as the need arose. So we had a personal relationship going back to 1973, which made it possible that we could work together without intruding or stepping on each other's toes. Plus, the main advantage was that our staffs knew better than to cause trouble for the other's staff, because the bosses would just call each other. A lot of your problems on Capitol Hill are caused by someone down here deciding they want to make a run on something over there; people at the top don't even know about it until it's a brouhaha, then they are fighting with each other. We avoided that.
DW: So there was no need for you to be interested in Conference matters, because Margo was there and you had your own business to tend to.

MH: I was interested in Conference insomuch as making sure our issues got supported and our Senators who were working with Senator McClure got supported. And wherever possible that would be done.

DW: I'm just trying to sketch out McClure's position. He's chairman of the Conference, and he also has close ties to the Steering Committee.

MH: Very close—which paid off—yes.

DW: How so?

MH: Bad terminology! Not paid off—was advantageous.

DW: How was that useful to him? That's what I was going to ask you.

MH: First of all, Margo was staff director of the Steering Committee before she went to Conference. What you did was build up a close working relationship between certain Senators on a wide range of issues, which gave you the advantage when you got into a debate or a problem that you knew where these other ten, fifteen Senators were on that particular issue and how they would react in a certain way. When we got into a debate on an energy issue, Senator McClure could talk to the Senators, I could talk to the staff. We knew pretty much in advance who would be for us, who would be against us, who would be strong, and what might be able to be done to work something out. All these little networks on Capitol Hill are advantageous, even though they are not connected.

DW: Senator McClure was chairman of the Interior Appropriations Subcommittee.

MH: That's right. Being chairman of the Committee and chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee and chairman of the Conference and on the Steering Committee, plus his close personal relationship with George Bush and his early support for President Reagan.

DW: What was the basis of his connection with Bush? Had they been in the House together?
MH: Yes, they served in that same class in the House. They had both been 18-year-old Navy pilots in World War II. Mostly, it was personal; the two men really liked each other and hit it off well and the two wives got along well. That's not always that usual in Washington; people hit it off at that stage and they continue right on through.

DW: What I'm leading up to is this: McClure has a substantial independent power base in the Senate—very substantial when you come to think of it. Now, what then is his relationship, given his own independent power base, to Howard Baker as Republican leader in running the Senate?

MH: As Conference chairman, he was part of the leadership in his own mind. He had a good power base, but other Senators had similar power bases, but did not either understand or try to work with Senator Baker and quite often found themselves frustrated and not really knowing why. The fact that you worked closely with Senator Baker didn't mean that you would automatically get done what you wanted done, but the fact that you weren't working closely with him would make it almost impossible to get done what you wanted done. A lot of people just never understood that; they thought, "I'm the chairman of this and I'm that, that, and the other." Senator McClure, being around politics as long as he had and knowing Senator Baker as well as he did, realized that behind that pleasant, easy-going manner there was a really professional politician there who knew how these things worked and had ways of preventing you from doing something you wanted to do if he thought it was not in the best interests. So Senator McClure, very wisely, worked very closely with Senator Baker and occasionally would defer to him on issues, which Senator Baker appreciated because at the time he was getting all these demands, people coming in wanting things which they shouldn't have, just making his life very unpleasant.

DW: Give me an example of a thing somebody would come in and ask for that they shouldn't have.

MH: Oh, where do I start! Quite often, the president had made a decision, which was a good decision, and this particular Senator didn't like it because some friends back in his state didn't like it or he felt it affected him. So he would go to Senator Baker and say, "Howard! You've got to go in and beat on Ronald Reagan. You've got to tell him how horrible this is. You've got to change this. If you don't, I'm going to hold up all business on the floor for the next two weeks or I'm going to stop this bill on whatever." Their position was outrageous, their tactics were outrageous, but Senator Baker wasn't the type to turn around and say, "If
you do that, then this is what's going to happen to you." He would try to be reasonable with them. Several times on the floor late at night when bills were up and we were trying to go through amendments—and I'd say 70 or 80 percent of the Senate's work is not philosophical or political, it's just the work of the body has to be done—you get on the floor late at night, people want to go home, and Senator Baker was trying to get something done, then one Senator could decide to hold, "This is a good time to get what I wanted done" and come up and try to make Senator Baker promise that he would do this and get him that thing out of the committee or out of the House or out of the presidency. "If you don't, then I'm going to sit here and object and just hold this bill up and keep us here to two o'clock in the morning. I'm not filibustering, I'm just not going to enter into the accommodations." That just made Senator Baker's life very unpleasant.

DW: How would he react in those situations?

MH: He would try to be reasonable. A couple of times I felt like jumping up—of course, staff is not allowed to speak on the floor—I felt like saying, "Why don't you just tell this person to get off—you're not going to give them what they want and you're not going to hold this bill. Use the Lyndon Johnson approach, the carrot and the stick and don't try to be reasonable with people who you can't be reasonable with." In one case, I had to bite my tongue because I knew this Senator was into our Committee, looking for a really big piece of pork, which I didn't think he was going to get, but I felt like telling Senator Baker, "Look, why don't you tell him you're going to kill his pork in the Committee?" I never said it because I knew Senator Baker would not do that, that's just not the way he worked. He was trying to be a gentleman and a reasonable and responsible legislator, and these few people just really made life difficult.

DW: To go back to the McClure-Baker relationship, would you say that as a member of the leadership, McClure's power bases, in some sense or other, were available to Baker?

MH: Available to Baker? Most definitely. You could give Senator Baker that type of support, realizing he wasn't going to abuse it or take advantage of it.

DW: There must have been instances, however, when McClure and Baker were on opposite sides of an issue.

MH: From 1973 on it happened regularly. They were quite a bit on the opposite sides.
DW: Baker publicly declared that he was going to be Ronald Reagan's spear carrier, and he was going to advance Reagan's program in the Senate. We've already talked about at least one, the rationing matter where there was a clear difference between the position of McClure and the decision of the president. The legislation was vetoed, Baker upheld. Were there other instances that occurred to you or that you recall in which there was a rather clear-cut policy difference between McClure and the administration?

MH: Natural gas. We wanted to deregulate natural gas, but we realized that we would have problems with the House; there are people in the House with a very strong history of controlling natural gas prices. So the question was, “how do we accomplish what we wanted to do?” Our problem there was not with Reagan so much—whenever we could get through to Reagan, we had no problem—it was people who said, "The president opposes this type of business," and we had these hassles to go through.

DW: What role did Baker play in that natural gas business?

MH: Not an active role, I don't think. He was there, of course, because he was involved in everything, and we very wisely made sure that he and his staff were involved and knew what was going on so that when somebody came to him and told him something that was inaccurate, they would know in advance. As I recall, there was something else going on at that time, because we were having problems getting people's attention. I can't remember, but there was something else really major occupying Baker's time.

DW: We've hit on and around this, but let me ask you this. You were chief of staff—how did what you and the Committee were doing tie into leadership operations? We know about the meetings and so on and so forth, but when would you be in touch with Jim Range about something? Or when would McClure be in touch with Baker about something? How large a presence was the leader's operation in what you were doing at the Committee level?

MH: I would say almost daily; it wouldn't be a formal meeting—we'd have those—but this would be like running into Jim on the floor. Of course, Senators run into each other on the floor all the time, or they would run into each other at other meetings. You would just take advantage of that run-in to say, "Oh, by the way, we want to get this up to the House." Then how soon you get it and Howard Baker would say, "I've got this going until Thursday, let's squeeze you in Tuesday." That type of thing. I'd be doing the same thing with Range;
Range would call me up and say, "We want to get this through. We've got a time frame for this bill, which Senator Baker is interested in, can you get it through the markup and get it to us?" So I would talk to the Senator.

DW: Did you ever get the impression that they were interested in shaping the content of legislation as it was moving through the Committee?

MH: Yes, there would be times; of course, it would be unusual if they didn't. Sometimes there would be a strong interest in a bill, sometimes it would be a weak interest. One time there was an ironic situation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission—which wasn't our Committee jurisdiction, but it was something that Senator Baker and Senator McClure and Senator Dominici were pushing real hard to do.

DW: What were they trying to do?

MH: It was an appointment, they were very slow on appointments. We were fighting with this one fellow at the White House; he kept putting us off and putting us off. Finally one day a name came down, and it was his name! It reminded me of the story John Warner told of how he became Assistant Secretary of the Navy the same way.

DW: He sent down his own name?

MH: He was deputy to the White House under the Nixon administration, and when all these resumes came in for Assistant Deputy Secretary of the Navy, he just threw them in the drawer. He knew it would take them months to get them; finally, they came down one day and wanted nominees for the position; John Warner said he sent his own name in! He told that story in an open luncheon, that's the only reason I would repeat it. In this case, the guy had obviously been sitting on this position, waiting for the right time. I thought, "Something smells here," so I talked to some other friends in the White House. I found out what happened was that they were waiting for the president to get on a plane, he's going out of town, and they came running in and said, "By the way, Senator Baker and Senator McClure want this position filled, they are really putting pressure on it; they've bought off on this guy." Reagan said, "If they want him, fine." Then they called us up and said, "The president wants this man." So with that knowledge, I told Senator McClure who talked to Senator Baker; the two of them went down and met with Ronald Reagan. He said, "I thought you wanted him. If you don't want him, that's it." Reagan was another nice fellow
who couldn't believe evil of his own staff. The upshot was that I got a call from another White House guy who just ripped me up one side and down the other—he was not even top level—but he was going to get even with Baker and McClure for stopping this appointment. I said, "Hold on! Get even with the majority leader and the chairman of the Committee because they went to the president and he agreed with him?" He said, "Yes," and I have a feeling that they did, later on.

DW: You have a feeling of what?

MH: That they did get even with Baker and McClure later on.

DW: How could they do that?

MH: The White House is a Byzantine labyrinth. I never understood how it worked, except I was able to warn a few of my friends who went into the White House that when they started getting problems. "Your problems," I said, "aren't coming from the Democrats or the liberal press. Your problems are people in the office next to you who are trying to knife you and get you out so they can take over." They couldn't believe that anyone would behave like that. But they have ways of getting even with people or causing problems for people which can't be traced back.

DW: Did you ever feel that the leadership operation was a problem for the Committee?

MH: No.

DW: Talk a little bit about White House and departmental liaison and the kind of attention they paid to the Committee.

MH: Initially, the White House took the position—not the president, of course, or the vice president—

DW: I'm talking about congressional liaison people.

MH: Congressional liaison was no problem. They would get their orders, somebody would make a decision; it reminded me of the old 1973 days when we had to fight with Erlichman and Haldeman. I almost felt sometimes they were back in there! They would get together
around the table in the morning and make a decision and then it would go down the line; the congressional liaison would call and say, "This is the decision." I would laugh and say, "That's completely ridiculous. It can't be done. The Senator won't support it. We can't get any Republicans to support it. It's asinine, it hurts the president." "Oh, no, no, that's the decision." So I would have to go to the Senator and tell him what these people were doing, then we'd try to work our way back up the line. We could never pin down who had started this idiotic idea, which was going to embarrass the president, embarrass Senator Baker and Senator McClure and all the Republicans. It was just a combination of arrogance and ignorance in certain offices there. I'll give you another good example. We found out about Governor Edwards' nomination to be Secretary of Energy from the Washington Post. I went into the chairman, I was livid; here we are, we had just taken over, and the chairman wasn't even notified that this man was going to be nominated. Another time, a reporter from the Wall Street Journal came to my office with an energy policy bulletin and wanted my comments on it. I said, "I've never seen this. What are you talking about?" He said, "I was given this by the White House; it's the new energy policy." I called up and the guy on the other end flat out lied to me; he said, "There's no such policy." I said, "I've got a copy here." He said, "You might have some draft that somebody's circulating." Three days later, we got our official position, and it's word for word the same as the reporter had.

DW: Was this coming out of some policy shop in the White House?

MH: It was an arrogance, a feeling of "we're running the country, and you Republican Senators are there to do what we tell you to. We'll give you your marching orders." The Democrats loved it, because they had gone through the same thing during the Carter years.

DW: And now you guys know what it feels like!

MH: Actually, I had better knowledge sometimes of what was going on during the Carter days, because I dealt with the low-level people in the White House who would get it before one in the chain of command, whereas Mike Harvey and Dan Dreyfuss had to deal with the top people, who couldn't give it to them until it was cleared. Strange city.

DW: Did you get any sense of what the working relationship was between Baker's operation and White House liaison and departmental liaison?
MH: Very close. It had to be; his staff was in daily contact with them. They had a worse problem than I did because they were fighting this same battle on a much broader range of issues.

DW: On every front.

MH: On every front. And as the majority leader's operation expanded, he would have differences within his own shop, which complicated things. Of course, I had problems within my own staff, Senator McClure's staff, which I was director of, who disagreed on things and would use their own little routes or leaks or something to accomplish their ends. But they had to work very closely with the White House liaison. I'd say at the department level, we realized after a while that department congressional relations were—there were a lot of good people there and they did good work, but you would go to them for a specific thing you needed, but as far as policy, they were more and more reporting to the White House. The White House was telling the Secretaries what to do, which was a major blunder because the White House didn't know sometimes, but they appointed these people to be loyalists and carry out their orders. The same way we were supposed to carry out their orders!

DW: Did you have any difficult confirmation fights on the Committee?

MH: The first two were Watt and Edwards; they were pretty straightforward. Later we had some problems with nominees whom we felt weren't supporting the president, and we tried to point that out to them. We were just told by the White House that the president wants these people, that type of thing. Later, events in each case proved these people were not Ronald Reagan supporters and they had friends of their own. We had quite a few Carter people sent up for confirmation, who we rejected. These people were appointed by Jimmy Carter and here the Reagan White House was promoting them. We'd get back, "They were really our friend the whole time. They were helping." You have someone who was working for Jimmy Carter and betraying his trust to Jimmy Carter, now you want to put him in your administration? The other argument was, "He's changed his position." In one case I said, "I know for a fact this man has been overseas with our allies quoting the Carter position, which we completely disagree with. Are you going to send this same man back to a European to make reverse arguments? He would have no credibility." But this kept happening all through the time period there.
DW: That's interesting; I didn't realize there was that dimension to it. This is completely off the subject, and it really has no direct relationship to what we are talking about, but it's something that is relevant. Senator Metzenbaum was a member of your committee, tell me a little bit about him and how one deals with him.

MH: One of my first experiences with Senator Metzenbaum involved a controversial issue we were working on, so I made a point of working closely with his staff person directly on this issue. The day of the markup came, and I went to this staff and said, "We are getting ready to mark this bill up. I think we've taken care of all Senator Metzenbaum's concerns." He said, "Yes, the Senator has assured me he has no more problems. We can go ahead." I told the chairman, and we went into markup. In the first five minutes Senator Metzenbaum objected and started ripping the bill all apart. Of course, I assumed the staff person had misled me; it turned out later that Senator Metzenbaum had deliberately misled his staff person for some tactical advantage. The staff person quit shortly thereafter—as did many of Metzenbaum's staff people! After awhile I realized there was a method to what he did; it outraged us, but it produced this fear of Senator Metzenbaum. He wasn't a man you could deal with in the normal fashion. It got so bad that he had a hold on virtually all of the legislation going to the floor; you couldn't bring it up unless Senator Metzenbaum had cleared off. In one case he was out having dinner with someone, and we had to hold a bill up until we could get in contact with Senator Metzenbaum—on a bill he had no jurisdiction on. I finally came up with what I thought was a reasonable approach: I said, "Ohio is a major recipient of billions of dollars, particularly like the gas centrifuge project. My suggestion to you Senators is that it's time to go in and talk to Senator Metzenbaum. This works both ways." Unfortunately, the Senators I was dealing with were much more gentlemanly and responsible; they weren't about to go out and challenge a good project.

DW: I had noted an instance on July 16, 1982, when Metzenbaum mounted a filibuster on a water bill, trying to force McClure and Wallop who were managing the bill to make changes that had little support among other Senators and had been voted down several times before. Does that ring a bell with you?

MH: Yes, it was just typical. He would filibuster anything, he enjoyed it. In fact, I mentioned to the chairman one time during a markup—he asked me about Senator Metzenbaum's concern with this bill—I said, "Senator, look at him closely. I don't think he cares about the bill at all. He's enjoying the hatred and outrage being expressed by other Senators." And some of them were on his own side. It was almost a childish look on his face of pleasure.
that he had dropped this bomb and outraged all these people; they were screaming and shouting, and he was enjoying that.

DW: Do you have any insights to his relationship with Baker or how Baker attempted to deal with him?

MH: No, I couldn't shed any light at all on how Baker and Metzenbaum worked. I know we had problems being on the Committee. I know his own Senators had trouble; basically, it came down to "give him what he wants."

DW: When it came down to take a Committee bill to the floor, I assume Senator McClure would manage it on the floor?

MH: Not always but most of the time.

DW: If McClure didn't, it would be the chairman of a subcommittee?

MH: Or Wallop or Dominici.

DW: What was the division of responsibilities between the bill manager or managers and Baker and Baker's operation? Of course, Baker would schedule it, but beyond that, who would be doing what?

MH: First of all, you had to develop a rapport and reputation with Senator Baker and his staff, because quite often someone would come in and say, "We've got to get this bill from the floor!" Not our Committee, of course, but others. They would say, "OK, are there any problems?" "No, it will take us twenty-four hours or two days." Then they would get up there and it turns out it's a three week thing, which just really infuriated Senator Baker's staff and sometimes Senator Baker. So you had to develop this reputation; you went to him and said, "We want to bring this up." He would say, "What are the problems?" and you had to be honest with him, which Senator McClure was anyway. There are no secrets in Washington. "Do this; we'll have this problem here and that problem there, and it will work out."

DW: "These amendments are coming up," that sort of thing?
MH: "We'll get this support from one half of the White House, there's opposition from the other half of the White House. These groups are for it. These are the problems it could cause you personally." That was always a good one to throw in: "You're going to get flack from this group and that group." Do your homework, in other words. Then he would make the decision, which was usually to go ahead based on what you had told him. Then after the bill got going, always some glitch would come up, you'd have to huddle with the other Senators' staffs in the cloakroom. You'd be back there, Baker's staff would be coming in, Senators' staff coming in, everybody's staff coming in. You would have as many as thirty people gathered, all trying to get in a circle. Then they would all disappear and it would be the two of you, hammering away at a point for two hours; then they would all come back.

DW: This is when somebody throws in an amendment that was unexpected or a vote goes in a way you had not expected on an amendment?

MH: Or somebody didn't understand an amendment originally, or somebody outside the Hill had suddenly found out about the amendment and immediately called their friend to say, "This thing is outrageous, it has to be stopped," so the Senator runs down to the floor; he doesn't know what it's about, he just knows it has to be stopped, and he stops it until he finds out. Which is a legitimate tactic; you don't know what's happening, put a hold on it until you find out. Then you have to huddle with him and find out what their problem is. In some cases they have to call back to find out what the problem is, then you go around and around. But it takes time and stress.

DW: When does Baker get involved in the course of a situation like that?

MH: Like any other Senator, really, he would come in and out. You have a changing cast of characters at any particular point in this. Baker and McClure might be meeting with, say, Metzenbaum and Aberisk; then they might split off, and the staffs would meet. Then Baker would come back and meet with Byrd, and McClure would come back and meeting with someone else.

DW: But when there is a snafu, Baker, as leader, is there as leader trying to facilitate, straightening things out, is that what you're saying?

MH: There would be a right time for him to come in, particularly when a Senator was involved. Most of these problems would start off at the staff level, and it was important that the staffs
would go as far as they could. If they could resolve it, great; if they could come up with something that their Senators would buy off on, then Senator Baker wouldn't have to get involved at all. It's when they came down and just couldn't go any further at the staff level. Then the two Senators would have to come together; if they couldn't resolve it, Senator Baker would have to come in and do what he could to resolve it—like the 55 mile an hour speed limit.

DW: But this time on the floor.

MH: It's the same technique whether it's the floor or in the private office, committee markup.

DW: When you've got a fairly complex Department of Interior authorization bill or something like that coming to the floor, if there are some conflicts and maybe sensitive amendments, do you generally know pretty well what is going happen once it gets to the floor?

MH: You think you do. But as I learned early on in 1973 when I first started going to the floor, it's an extremely fluid situation. You think you know what is going to happen, you plan for it, you're prepared, you've got everything ready to go, but once it starts moving, anything can happen.

DW: So the surprise amendment arises, any number of things.

MH: One of my most unique experiences was when Senator McClure told me to stay on the floor, there was a particular amendment he did not want to come up; I was sitting on the floor, I had been there for hours.

DW: When was this?

MH: Nelson Rockefeller was vice president.

DW: Early to mid 1970s.

MH: I had been sitting on the floor back there, two or three of us back on the staff benches, and you just sit there. There was one Senator in the chair who was doing correspondence and another Senator was droning on about some speech; they were on a bill, but he was just making a speech. Another Senator was over there, just sitting there watching the floor, so to
speak. This went on for hours and hours; suddenly, the Senator on the other side got up and walked into the cloakroom. The Senator who was making a speech looked around, and he was the only Senator on the floor. He thought, "Here's an opportunity to get something done," so he immediately calls up an amendment and asked for unanimous consent. The guy in the chair suddenly comes up to what's going on; the cloakroom hears it, comes running out; they grab the Senators to come in and get opposition going—the fellow who had started it originally was on a roll, he was going to get this thing done before they could get there, which is not a good way to do things because there are ways to take care of that later. Senators started flocking in from the cloakrooms, from hideaways, offices; finally they demanded a vote. I didn't have privilege for the floor for that vote so I had to get off the floor. I'm trying to get off the floor and Senators are just streaming in. As I started for the door, the doors bust open and Nelson Rockefeller walks in and takes the chair. I get there and look around, I realize it's the first and probably only time in my life there's 100 Senators sitting in the chamber and the vice president is presiding. They took the vote, the guy's motion was defeated, everyone disappeared, a few minutes later I'm back sitting on the bench, the same two Senators are droning on. It was all over in less than one-half hour! You couldn't sit in your office and follow that kind of thing.

DW: Going back to where we started, you're preparing something to bring to the floor and you go over what's involved and what you expect to happen carefully with Baker's staff and so on. When it comes to such things as seeing if there is unanimous consent requests that have to be negotiated, the first cut at it is done by the Committee people.

MH: That's correct. Time agreements, that was the majority leader's biggest thing: "Get me a time agreement. I don't care if we have to spend 20 hours on it, but let's have a time agreement." So we spent more hours coming up with time agreements than anything else. And UCs, which is a requirement for a time agreement. That's where the real behind-the-scenes, cloakroom, give-and-take—and that's where Senator McClure and Senator Baker excelled because it's a very low-key type thing. It's got to be done in private, because you're asking people to give up something. It's something they publicly have come out and said that they are going to fight to the death on, it's never going to pass without it, and you're asking them to agree to 15 minutes on it. In private, they can realize they are not going to get it, it's a bad idea, and they will agree to it. If it became public, there's no way they could agree to it, they would have to demand a filibuster. But Senator McClure and Baker and others, of course, could sit back and quietly work out these UCs on time agreements and other things. There you are really talking about personal trust; people will say, "I'll do this
later, but you give me what I want now." In politics, you always try to get your part of the bargain first. But when Senator Baker would say, "I'll do this later if you will do this now," they would do it.

**DW:** You've touched on this on several points in several different ways, but tell me your views on Baker's leadership styles and skills. What were the things he really had going for him?

**MH:** People trusted him, people liked him. He was conscientious and understood that you can't sit in your office and run the business of the Senate; it's a person-to-person type job. You will have meetings in your office, but you've got to be constantly talking to people, staying on top of things and going here and going there. He was a knowledgeable individual on how the system works, which says a lot because there are people who have been here for years who don't know how the system works. That sums it up: conscientious, honest, somebody you liked.

**DW:** How did he go about persuading people to do things?

**MH:** Quite often he didn't, but his style was the same in my experience: reason. "Here's what you want to do—we can't do it. Here's what we can do instead." Or, "If you can't take that, let's try this." He would just keep reasoning; at some point, he might have to take a break: "We'll put our staffs together. We'll come back together." Just keep at it. It's very frustrating; maybe lawyers are better prepared for that, as an engineer, it used to drive me crazy!

**DW:** You want closure.

**MH:** Closure, that's the term my wife uses all the time, "You want closure." Let's get it done! He was successful.

**DW:** Were there any serious complaints that you were aware of coming from Senators in regard to Baker's leadership?

**MH:** There were complaints from Senators about philosophy; sometimes they felt we should be more aggressive in certain issues—more conservative. There were complaints that he wasn't rough enough on the White House, that he tried to work too closely with the White House. That to me was not a serious complaint—here you had Ronald Reagan doing great
things, and we were working with him to do those things. My personal complaint was that he, like Reagan and McClure, did not recognize that there are people in this town who don't think and work like we do. There are people who will not keep their word, they are working for Ronald Reagan but they despise Ronald Reagan. They will openly tell you they despise Ronald Reagan; their only thing is to improve their own position inside the White House. These kind of people you can't reason with, you can't trust, you can't work with. You have to get them out of there, send them off somewhere else. This is the problem Reagan had, Senator Baker had, Senator McClure had; they could not recognize—evil is too strong a word—they could not recognize the irrational. Their feeling was that this individual depends on me solely for their livelihood. If you are a Senator or the president, you've hired this person, you can fire them with ten seconds notice. The only reason they are here is because you brought them in; if they don't do their job, you can get rid of them. So how in the world, why would they do something detrimental to me, the only person responsible for them being here? I would have that argument with Senator McClure in particular cases, and I did not have an answer—I still don't have an answer. Why an individual who owed everything to the Senator would then go out and talk to a reporter or do something with another Senator that would hurt the Senator. The only logical reason I could find—not logical—but the only reason I could find was that usually it resulted in another member of the staff being hurt. Like in the White House, if you could embarrass President Reagan and blame it on your colleague next door, then that weakened him and strengthened you. I guess it came down to just an ego.

DW: Did you think that Baker had some problems on his staff in that regard?

MH: I think so; I think all Senators as they go up in stature, your staffs enlarge, just by percentages you're going to have a couple of overly ambitious people in there who are going to play this game. Senator McClure, who had a smaller staff, had the problems. It's just a very difficult problem for a decent person like that to recognize.

DW: How would you characterize Baker's power position as leader in the Senate? How much power does the leader really have? Does it make any difference who is leader? Do people defer to leadership? Do Republican Senators defer to leadership? Does the leader have distinctive resources that can make him extraordinarily influential?

MH: I said earlier that I think the majority leader of the Senate is probably the number two man in the government, maybe most of the world. I should have said "can be." If he's a Lyndon
Johnson or Senator Byrd, someone of that type, he has incredible power. If he uses it, he will be the number two man in the government. As a matter of fact, he will be at the point where the president will have to come to him. When you have an individual like Senator Baker who is not on an ego trip, not out there seeking personal power and control and expansion and constant building of turf and power, people recognize that fairly early—that he's not on an ego trip. And they also recognize that he's not a vindictive person. This was Senator McClure's biggest weakness—people found out that they could do him dirt, lie to him or double-cross him, and he would not hold a grudge or try to get even. That's a big weakness in Washington.

DW: Did Baker cause things to happen? Did he change votes? Did he cause things to pass that otherwise might have failed?

MH: I'll put it this way, we went to the floor to override President Reagan's veto on the gasoline [thing]—we had the votes—and during the activity preceding and during the vote Senators were being—Senator Baker, I'm sure—I can't prove it, but I'm pretty sure—was working with the White House. He was talking to Senators and then calling the White House. Then the Senator would get a call: "Reagan's on the phone." The key Senator would go in, Reagan would say, "I really need you on this one." The Senator would come out and say, "Jim, I'm sorry but I've got to with the president." He did it without personally attacking Senator McClure and making it a power thing, but he accomplished what he wanted to do.

DW: And he won that vote.

MH: It was sustained.

DW: The veto was sustained.

MH: He accomplished a lot of things that people aren't aware of through the same technique. If it had become known, it would have made it more difficult to have done it the next time. If we had had 51 Senators like him and McClure and a few others, it would be a much different world. This city seems to attract a certain type of people.

DW: Any final comments you would like to make?
MH:  I'm very pleased that I was invited to participate in this.  I think his place in history is assured; he's one of the most decent human beings and best Senators, best majority leaders, I have ever experienced.  I'm just glad to be part of this history.

DW:  Your comments have been very helpful.  Let me conclude with thanking you once again for helping out.