
Interview with Tom Griscom

The interview was conducted by David Welborn in Winston-Salem, North Carolina on May 30, 1995

Audio cassette 44
DW: This is an interview with Tom Griscom… in his offices at R. J. Reynolds in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The date is… May the 30th, 1995. It's mid-afternoon, now. We've enjoyed the day in Salem, I mean, excuse me, in Winston-Salem. We took a look at the Wake Forest campus, went over to Old Salem, had a little lunch, and all in all it's been a lovely day thus far, and we appreciate your… having us in this afternoon.

I'd like to ask you a question about Senator Baker's campaign for re-election in 1978, which we talked about extensively in our previous conversation. Ron McMahan made an interesting comment when I was talking to him about that campaign. And, it was that this was the only… political situation, the only campaign, in which Senator Baker seemed to him to be anxious about the outcome. I wonder how you would react to that.

TG: Well, _____, Ron [would probably] have a better perspective than, than I would, because Ron had been around the Senator for, you know, a longer period of time, since I just came to work for him during the 78 campaign. But, it clearly was the first time he'd been back since the Panama Canal vote. And I do know, having been a reporter at the time that happened, and having done some of the interviews with him, and… and realizing that there was an overwhelming majority of Tennesseans who were opposed to the treaties, even after he tried to explain, you know, the add-ons and things like that, that I do think that, that he was concerned… that in this case he had cast a vote, it wasn't the first time he had cast a vote which maybe was not the most popular, but this one had a lot of ground swell of opposition. And opposition coming from the conservative part of the state. And, and _____ if you look back at that point in time, that clearly the whole conservative movement was really coming, you know, coming, [you know], into play, and that it was going to take out of a Republican’s vote, not a Democrat’s, but a Republican’s, so I think that was part of it, _____ going back and [saying], "How much built-up animosity is there?" If you recall… I'm trying to remember the guy's name: Tom Anderson?

DW: Yes.

TG: Yes, that's right. Over in… Sevierville, had mounted a primary challenge, not because he thought he was going to defeat Senator Baker, but really trying to leverage the Canal issue as sort of, you know, 'nick him' a little bit before he got into the general election. And so I think that's part of it. And, and clearly there were, you know, there were some indicators… within the, within some of the polling that was done. Now they spread back out as we got on into the fall. But there were some early indicators that this race could be much closer than it should have been.
Ron suggested, this was simply a theory, that Senator Baker… the situation… in regard to how Senator Baker saw it, may have been complicated by the fact that his opponent was a woman, and he was a little uncertain as to how to deal with that.

Yah. I, I would agree with that. I mean, if you add that into the political issue of the Canal, that… I think today, because more women have run, that you'd find, you know… that politicians know better about how to run that kind of a race, but I may be wrong here, but I've got to believe it's probably the first time statewide that a woman had run for office, as a Democrat. And that, and there were some statements being made… and gosh, I'm trying to remember the right, the right one, but I… there was an issue out there where she attacked Senator Baker, but about a year-and-a-half, or two years earlier, she had come to Washington [to lobby him], you know --

I think that was the Canal ______.

It may be, it may be the right one. Where she had come to Washington sort of in support of it, but how did you find that balance where people realize [it was] a legitimate political issue to be raising versus coming across as someone who was mean-spirited, and attacking a woman. And [there] was always a real fine line in there about, you know, how do you, how do you deal with this? But I would agree with that premise that Ron laid out. That… ______ knew exactly how to deal with a woman running in a race, and when you keep in mind that what people [were] looking at wasn't just how he did in [the] Senate race in Tennessee, but the whole demeanor: how did he handle it? How did he react to a female candidate? And then take that on into a presidential run. There was a lot of things riding in this whole race, as we've talked about before.

Right. Well, let's move on to the presidential campaign in 1979 and 1980. When you think back over that period and that experience, what are the things that really stand out in your mind? What are the [experiences] or the situations that have really stuck with you?

Okay. And… we'll lay these out and you can sort out the order. Senator Baker has such a respect for the office of the presidency, and the person who fills that job at any point in time, that, you know, it was a little difficult, I know, from personal experience, for him to sort out being the leader in the Senate for the Republicans, working with Jimmy Carter, at that point, as the President. How do you sort of separate yourself away from being a point person in the Senate that needs to be advised, and also provide counsel to the president
versus someone who is trying to run against him? One issue [at hand] very clearly, [that] sort of summed it up, was going into Iowa back in 19… oh boy.

DW: Was this during the caucuses?

TG: No, it was before that. It was in, it was in, it was cold, I can tell you that because we were frozen when we got in there. It was the coldest place I've ever been in my life. Because we wrapped up in blankets flying home that night, it was so cold inside the plane. But, it's when Carter announced the grain embargo against [the] Soviet Union. And we got off the plane, and in the interim period, while we had left Washington to get to Iowa, this announcement had been made. And we had an NBC crew waiting for us. It was either Tom Pettit or Steve Delaney, I'm not sure which one. And, [of] course [we got there], there was a message waiting for us, and almost within [an] instant you could see a switch turn. And [the] Senator changed from being a candidate for President in a state where a grain embargo is going [to] be a big issue, to a leader again in the Senate. Because when he got asked the question, his response, without any hesitation was, "I really can't comment on that. I need to talk to the President so I know clearly why he took this position," etc., etc. And at that point, you could just, I mean, you could sort of feel yourself sink a little bit, because of all states to be asked the question, to have provided what was a legitimate point of view for him as a, as one of the two party leaders in the Senate, to have taken that stance and have given up, given away what was a potentially strong presidential issue of coming out, might not have been totally responsible to have said, "I'm opposed to any kind of embargoes. I don't think they serve a purpose," etc., etc., ______ it was that, you know, [a] legislative mind [sort of] saying, "I need to talk to the President before I respond." So that's one thing that sort of sticks with you. [Second thing], probably, was the fact that we may have had the shortest lived campaign in history. Expectations were great. The media liked Senator Baker. I think they wanted to see the campaign really take off. He looked like a real viable alternative to… Ronald Reagan and to others who were running more conservative. But to have announced ______, you know, to announced on a Friday, [and by] Sunday night we [were] basically over. Because we went to Maine, and we had not managed appropriately the expectation of how we ought to come out of a non-binding caucus in the State of Maine, particularly when we had Senator Bill Cohen and his staff working for us, and while he still won that caucus, it was clearly not by the margin that people had expected. And it's almost like we announced on a Friday and by that following Sunday, ______ over.
DW: Well, actually, actually, Bush came out on top by about 1 percent.

TG: Yah. [You refresh my memory]. I knew it was, I didn’t remember exactly, but it was devastating. And try as hard as you could to put a spin on it, you know, we hadn't expected this or that. Well, that really didn't hold up because, yah, [I mean], people looked at the schedule saying, "You would not have put this on your announcement schedule if you had not expected to come in here and have a boost. You would not have had the Senator from Maine out there with his staff working it, and your own people up here working hard to try to line up delegates if you had not expected that this was going to be a shot in the arm."

DW: What do you remember about that trip?

TG: Well I remember a sense --

DW: [From] your own personal experience?

TG: A sense of euphoria coming out, because the announcement had gone great.

DW: [You went] to Rhode Island first.

TG: We went to Rhode Island --

DW: And that went well.

TG: Then we went to New Hampshire, and brought in a Buddy's Bar-B-Que. And, that went great. [The day], then we went up to Maine, and the Senator went over to Vermont to do an event… that Governor Snelling had set up for him, and a lot of people saying, " Well,” you know, that “venture off and going to Vermont, you probably should have stayed in Maine and worked it. But that was another signal where you must have felt like that you had this thing in the bag, when you, when you went ahead and scheduled something that morning, to go to Vermont, rather than staying in Maine to work it." And from, you know, starting off [on a real hop], because everything had gone extremely well, the announcement things in New Hampshire, Rhode Island, to end up with a real downer. And it was. I mean, when you got back on that plane… I mean, it was, I mean, you know, _____ it was too long to [assume] it was over, because you still had time to go, but you really knew that, at that
point, that the media, if the media if nobody else really felt let down. Because they had hoped [the thing] would work. You know, they liked Senator Baker a lot, and we sort of felt trapped in our own expectations. There was a great sense of depression, and trying to sort of sit there and think back on that, and it was, [you] felt like the longest plane ride in the world. What could we have done different? Where did we mess it up?

DW: What's your answer to that?

TG: Well, the answer is, I don't think we had… I don't think we had our hands around all the levers that you needed to run the campaign. We, we just had not, we had not spent the necessary time to really get focused. And, you know, _____, without casting stones, the campaign, for all intents and purposes, was being run out of the Majority Leader's office. But the on the ground, you know, political stuff was being run out of the campaign headquarters. And the two are not necessarily hooked up totally. And, and I think if there's any lesson out of it, it's, "You better have one group of people who are always sitting down understanding what's gotta happen. You cannot have a campaign team over here doing something, and having the real decision making… [you know], five minutes away in a whole different office, because the two don't necessarily hook up all the time. There was one other thing that, that clearly was a [determinant]. You know, part of the tragedy later on was that the… Senator, rather than having to traipse around the country, like everybody else, [was] going to be able to use the SALT hearings… as a spring board. And to be on national television, you know, every night, because the hearings were going to be televised, and clearly he was going to be in a position of high visibility and to really sort of demonstrate his command of, you know, not only domestic type issues but the whole foreign policy agenda. And, when the treaty never came forward, when President Carter chose not to set it up there because it looked like it would fail, you could understand from his standpoint not doing that, but it really sort of sent the whole campaign strategy off on a different tangent, because it knocked out one of the very, very fundamental things that had been baked into this, and that is that you will get the exposure, a lot of exposure that most candidates are having to go out and run around the country to get, and spend money to get [to] paid advertising, you won't get it beamed into people's homes every night, with the SALT hearings that were going to come up, [it] didn't happen. There were just a lot of breaks. I mean, you sort of sit back and say maybe the stars weren't lined up right, because all [of] the breaks went the wrong way. They really did.
DW: You said a moment ago that the campaign was actually run out of the Leader's office. Who were the main players in the Leader's office, or working out of the Leader's office –

TG: Ron McMahan and Jim Cannon. Rob Mossbacher, to a lesser extent. It was really Ron and Jim.

DW: Well what kinds of decisions were they making?

TG: Oh, [you'd] make all kinds of decisions. You know, _____, where he was going to go, you know, what kind of appearance he would make. There might be recommendations on making this phone call, whatever. They would, you know, [they’d sort of] be looked at and filtered. You know, [I mean], final sign-off on schedules _____, I understand all that, because I was in a similar kind of role, you know, for the Senator for the final 4 years. And, while we weren't in [a] campaign mode, there has to be a central place that understands Senator Baker, how he works best, what the schedule was he was keeping in the Senate, and how that would dove-tail into [a] campaign. And the real, you know… the real issue here was that he was not a full-time candidate, and he was not necessarily a full-time legislator, although he had spent the bulk of his time, you know, as the Leader still. But you had two things pulling against him, and clearly the campaign piece was the one that was always being pulled up behind the other. And, and I think there was a legitimate level of concern about, well these people don't understand Senator Baker well enough to know how he works, how to get the maximum out of him, these kinds of things. And, so you had a lot of shared things. It doesn't mean that Don Sundquist didn't spend a lot of time up there, he did. But the fundamental decision-making, you knew where the power finally rests --

DW: Um-hm.

TG: and it rest up there.

DW: Well, this is somewhat replicative of what you said, but the impression I've gathered from talking to people about the campaign… goes, [an] impression goes something like this. You had the Senator… Ron, and Jim Cannon, as you indicate, with Cannon, this is according to Cannon himself, thinking that he should have been playing a larger role in the overall scheme of things than he actually was, or was allowed to do.
TG: Right.

DW: Then you have Don Sundquist and the campaign staff doing whatever it was they were doing… and then sort of separate from that, you had Fred [Smits], and then Ted Welch doing the money raising.

TG: Right.

DW: Then you had Doug Bailey sort of whispering in the Senator's ear

TG: Right, right.

DW: And then poor Bill Roesing trying to write [his] campaign plan which nobody seemed to be particularly interested in, and --

TG: Although we talked about electric cars before their time now. _____, I'll tell you that. But _____, [I would not dispute anything you've laid out there]. I think that is exactly the problem of what was going on. Is that… you had a lot of pieces… that needed to be blended together --

DW: Yah.

TG: and the blending didn't occur.

DW: Yah. I said to… Doug Bailey --

TG: Let me give you_____. Let me talk to you about personal experience. I was on the Senate staff, and transferred off the Senate staff, and went down to campaign staff, and with an understanding that, when this is done, I really do expect to come back. And it wasn't because I thought I was going to fail, because I went down there in the summer of 79… to go on the campaign staff full time. But I was not going to get myself, you know, sort of caught up again in a campaign. I [had] seen some of the things happen to some of the people in the 78 campaign. There [were] some people who came down from Washington, as a matter of fact, and clearly it was with the full intention that they would never be back. And I did not come to Washington after that election in 78 and had been in Washington for
roughly five to six months to go down here and then say, "Okay, this is great. Now, adios." And, so while nothing is, I mean, legally there is nothing iron-clad, saying you are guaranteed this back. But I wanted to at least have some understanding that if this thing did not go right, that at least there was a strong potential to come back. Because actually I had just come off an experience where there were some people who clearly were... were sent to campaign with the full understanding they would not be back. And if the campaign didn't go right, there were going to be bodies flying everywhere. And you [sure] wanted to make sure yours wasn't one of those bodies that, you know. Because there is always a tension. We talked about this, I think, before. There's always a tension between the campaign staff and the personal staff for whoever it is. The two don't necessarily mix real well, because quite often the personal staff, the people who have been around the politician the longest know him best. You have the ear. I mean, it's what's called the closeness to the body. [If] you're close to the body, you've got a, you know, you've got [an] advantage. And there's a ______ a built-in tension, that the personal staff is trying to say, "I've got to work this set of issues today. Campaign staff is trying to figure out, "Well, I've got to take [care], you know, not only today but down the road." And, and, it's always, you're fighting over time. And... and that creates friction and tension, as things go forward. And if something goes south, then there's always somebody sitting back saying, "Well, who's going to take the fall?" You know, “for this not being successful.”

DW: One thing I am, I remain quite vague on, has to do with the process of campaign decision-making. Were there regular major meetings that Senator Baker participated in with his key advisors, personal and campaign? Was there some systematic way in which decisions were made, or was it kind of ad hoc, off the cuff, as the day and the week went by?

TG: Well, it's probably a mixture of all of the above. Until after, you know, until after the problem in Maine, where you sort of came down and shook things up. Before that, there would be a lot of filtering through Ron and Cannon, for a lot of the day-to-day stuff. And you know, there was probably at least a once-a-week, you know, session where Don Sundquist and others would come up and they'd sit down and sort of go through it. But Senator Baker never likes scheduling meetings. I mean, I've done that job with him. And, you know, I mean, you knew, you knew _____ when to approach him on scheduling matters, and how to present it to him. And, so just to sort of engage him was not going to be necessarily the best [thing] you had done that day. So there was a lot of filtering back and forth between Cannon and Ron. But if there needed to be a broader meeting, yah, I mean,
[there is] things [we’d] put on his schedule. I'd say [on average] ___ once a week or something like that. But the driver clearly was the… was the Senate office. I mean, that’s, that was the key, because again, you know, now this is after _____ the SALT hearing wasn't going to happen. Prior to that, I mean, it’s very, you know, a lot of what I would call control over his time, because again, you felt like at that point that you had [a sort] of built-in opportunity to project him out, similar to what he’d, you know, the same projection he’d gotten during the Watergate hearings, that that was going to be there. When I put together the, I did the advance work on the first trips he took during the Lincoln Day recess in 79. Went to Florida, and then we did some trips up in Illinois. I had never done advance work prior to that, but was sort of the initial person going out putting them together. And those were basically being coordinated with a lot of input from, you know, from Ron. And from Cannon. And, and it was really before you had more than just an exploratory committee, you know, sitting down there, not a lot of infrastructure, things like that. But, but as it evolved, that didn't change that much. Now I think it's fair to say that Doug Bailey, once the Maine thing happened, everybody saw this thing had not gone right. And when, you know, when that occurred, you were just a couple months away from the first real caucuses and primaries, that you had a real re-shuffling at the top, you know, “what do we need to do to get the campaign righted?” And then, much more focus on message, and I think a much stronger role that _____ Doug Bailey had in getting the Senator's ear.

DW: Did Bailey orchestrate that shake-up… after Portland --

TG: No.

DW: _____. How did that come about, and who was involved?

TG: Well, as I recall, I think the shake-up basically came from, I mean, I think the Senator _____ knew something wasn’t right. I mean, his instincts are very good. It didn't take a lot, though, to see that something had gone wrong. But I think the real [catalyst] is more from Cannon than from Ron. And, and [clearly they reached out to Doug and other people like this] to talk about it. But I think it was, the real push, you know, came more from the two of them.

DW: Did Senator Baker have any kind of a relationship with… Wyatt –

TG: Stewart.
DW: Stewart, prior to --

TG: Um-hm.

DW: what, what was the nature of that relationship?

TG: Well, you know, Wyatt’s from Tennessee. And so, _____ known Wyatt Stewart for years, because he's a fund-raiser, and so you'd always come across him in a lot of things that have been done. So yes, he knew him... knew a lot about him.

DW: And he was someone he was comfortable with.

TG: Somebody he was comfortable with, but again, and, you know, I mean, I may get, there may be some people who don't like this assessment, but, I don't, I think. Wyatt Stewart is a great guy. Wyatt Stewart is a fund-raiser. [And] that's his stock in trade. And, it was a plug that was being put in there for a period of time, but you didn't need a fund-raiser to come [in and] manage that campaign. You needed a campaign manager that basically had the full commitment, not only from Senator Baker, but from the people, you know, within the Senate office who were involved, saying, "The campaign's got to be run here. You've got to have the confidence _____ somebody to manage this thing and make it go." And… and so I looked at Wyatt as more of a stop-gap. You needed somebody to fill the void real quick. Doug Bailey knew him pretty well. But, you know, then they moved _____ brought Mitch Daniels in, and Dick Lugar became a much more active Chairman, you know, than he'd been up to that.

DW: Um-hm. [How] did the… do you have any… recollections or stories about traveling with Senator Baker during the campaign?

TG: The presidential campaign?

DW: Yes. Harrowing experiences or… unexpected situations encountered, that sort of thing?

TG: No, not really. [I mean], [there’s nothing] of the ordinary. I mean, I'm sure you're already aware of the microphone episode in New Hampshire, which was, you know, right --
DW: Right.

TG: before the New Hampshire primary.

DW: [You had] the debate.

TG: [Yah]. And, you know, and the Senator getting up [real] early one morning and going down to Portsmouth to shake hands at a shipyard, and it was so cold, you know, his knees were knocking. And he basically said, "You know, I don't do this in Tennessee. Why am I doing this up here!"

DW: Did he turn around and go [back to bed]?

TG: No, he stayed there. They kept him there, but he really was not happy, you know, having to do that. No, I mean, there's not a lot, I mean, because it was, I mean, at that point, I mean, for example, I was sent to New Hampshire for almost a month, prior to the New Hampshire primary, trying to get that, you know, do whatever we could to sort of get that thing shored up, because again, I think there was a recognition that, you know, we drop-shipped a lot of people from Iowa who had worked with us there, you know, to try to sort of revamp that campaign, and, and it was at least a [credible] showing. But, but we had the same problems, you know, we had the same fundamental problems any state you went into. We just had not spent the right time to get the politics right… to have the mechanics down.

DW: Did Senator Baker's views on Ronald Reagan change during the course of the campaign, or were they basically the same at the end of the campaign as they were when the campaign started?

TG: No, I don't think Senator Baker would have endorsed him in Pennsylvania, if they had been, you know, been the same. Cause, let's turn the clock back a little bit more, now.

DW: Okay.

TG: If you recall, in 1976…where, Senator Baker chose not to endorse, caused a little bit of ripple… when Ronald Reagan was challenging Gerald Ford. And that was, you know, that

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did not go down real well. And I think part of what he did in 76, [that] when the Senator asked President and Mrs. Reagan to come down for the World's Fair opening, I think it's one of the reasons he did his first overnight, outside of Washington trip like that was down to Huntsville, Tennessee, because I think that he remembered what he had done in 76. I think, I think Senator Baker, it's fair to say, probably had questions about… at that point, you know, Governor Reagan. You know, some of his positions…didn't agree with all of [his] positions on issues. But I think as things went forward, I think, I think the episode in New Hampshire, with the microphone was a telling event. And, you know, and prior to endorsing Ronald Reagan, he did have a chance to talk, you know, with Drew Lewis and others before he came out, and, and that was a difficult decision because, you know, to this day, I still think this part of what George Bush never forgot… is that Howard Baker came out at a pivotal point in the presidential campaign, although I still think Ronald Reagan would have been nominated, but he came out and endorsed Ronald Reagan prior to that, and basically from that point on it was, the nomination was done.

DW: What were the, _____ I realize this is speculation on your part but, what were the… qualities, what were Reagan's qualities that emerged during the course of the campaign, and… what were the aspects of his appeal… demonstrated during the campaign that, perhaps caused Senator Baker to alter his views somewhat?

TG: Well, I think probably one of them is that he felt like he was electable. I don't think there's any doubt about that. You cannot go, you cannot go around, you know, if you're involved in the presidential race at all, and get a sense that Ronald Reagan had tapped in… to the, you know, to the basic strengths of this country. I mean, he was there. [People responded to him]. [He] saw it. And, and that he was electable. And I don't think anybody expected that, you know, that he would carry with him the Senate, in the 80 election. That was sort of like a, an added bonus for us. But I think there was a feeling that yes, we would add numbers. But, you know, _____, nobody would predict that we were going to take over the Senate that night in November of 1980. But you got a sense that Ronald Reagan had tapped in… to a core set of values and a core set of messages that [were really] appealing to the American public. He was a different politician. He had a different message. And he had a different way of reaching out to people, and a warmth that came across, and people responded to it.

DW: A small point. Did Senator Baker have Secret Service traveling with him, during the campaign?
TG: Yes, he did.

DW: Were they the same people, or was it a… shifting, [general cadre]?

TG: Oh… I --

DW: I mean, do you remember any names, [or their] personalities?

TG: No, I don't remember off the top of my head. [But] they clearly made it a lot more difficult.

DW: How so?

TG: Well, because, when you don't have them you can do anything. When you have them, then you, _____, it's not as strict as when you're traveling with the President. But they really do sit there, and you have to start going through the whole routine of knowing in advance who's showing up, bull pens, things like this. I mean, and after --

DW: What do you mean, “bull pens?”

TG: Well, roped off areas… for the media [and] things like this. Then, when [you’ve campaign], up until then, with free access, and then all a sudden… the media shows up and you've got Secret Service, it changes... it changes the dynamics, a little bit. It changes their interaction. It's not that they don't expect it, at some point. But, and ____, and to be frank about it, I think bringing out Secret Service adds a sense of aura that this is an authentic campaign. I mean, it does add that to it, too. So there's a cosmetic kind of appeal to it, in addition to the security part that's valid. But it really does. It just causes a layer of bureaucracy to be built in, to deal with Secret Service type issues, which aren't easy.

DW: How did… this presidential campaign experience affect Senator Baker? Was he a different kind of politician afterward than he was before? Were his views, politically relevant views different… for going through the experience, or was he the same Howard Baker?

TG: Well, I don't think, I don’t think his views changed. But I don't think you could go through that experience and have been as disappointed, and have the media, basically, indicating a
disappointment. You know, all [of] this stuff about not having fire in his belly, he really didn't want this bad enough, that he didn't do the things that, you know, that you should have done if you're really committed to it, you know, you're making the phone calls, [sitting] out at the shipyard at six in the morning, that he wanted to spend more time with his camera, you know, taking pictures of people, then, you know, sort of shaking the hands, that he was still too connected to the Senate and wouldn't give that up to run full time. I mean, that part, I think, really bothered him. It bothered him a lot… on down the road in the final Senate term, of questions coming up. And even when he talked about running again, you'd get people saying, "Well, if he's going to go again, he's got to show more of a commitment, you know, more of a fire in the belly [that] he really wants it this time, you know, [than what they wanted then]. Because the media really felt like ____, he was their candidate, _____ he truly was.

DW: Was he bothered by such comments because he thought that they were… inaccurate, or because they came from his, quote, were coming from his quote friends, or… what was --

TG: [I think] he was bothered because he [felt] they were inaccurate. That they… he took them as meaning that he really did not want… to be President bad enough that he would just sort of give everything up. [And] he said, "I want to be President." I mean, [I know Howard wanted to get there]. It just didn't work out. But, [you know, if] you go back to what I said a little while ago about going to Vermont rather than staying in Maine, _____ the Maine caucuses, things like that, that, you know, _____ losing luggage. I mean, we started getting [the] stories where they can't even get the luggage right. When we overnight in Vermont, I don't remember exactly who it was, but we put, we had a female reporter _____ had a Secret Service person knocking on the door [or something] because they had the same [rooms], it got, you know, these kinds of things [the] press picks up on. If you're organized, and you get the luggage right, and you get people in their right rooms, all this kind of stuff, those things get magnified. And I think, it really, I know it bothered him, a lot, to hear people coming up saying, "Well,” you know, “do you really have the fire to do it?” You know, “are you really committed?” And that stuck with him. And, and it really just nagged on him, Because he said, "They just don't understand.” You know, “Yah, I wanted this. Some things just didn't go right. But if I'd had a break here or there, then they might have been saying exactly,” you know, “opposite.” Might have said, “this is the smartest [strategy] they'd even seen.” But it didn't work out. And that was one thing, I recall, really just sort of stayed with him. And it, and it really plagued him.
DW: When... Senator Baker received [the] call from President Reagan in, I think it was March of 87, about the Chief of Staff position, where was the prospective Baker 1988 presidential campaign in its development state?

TG: Well now, can I take you back before we get into that?

DW: Sure.

TG: It was February of 87.

DW: Yah, okay.

TG: We started with. There was one thing that happened prior to that.

DW: Okay.

TG: Is that Senator Baker [had] gotten a feeler... boy, _____, [you need to], somebody can give you the exact date, but whether he might be interested in being the new CIA director. And, he got the call from Don Regan... that, you know... that the President was going to make a move... and was this something that Senator Baker might be interested in doing. And, so Don Regan called him at home in Washington... and if I'm not mistaken, I think he got a call from Cissy that they'd picked it up.

DW: CNN.

TG: CNN. That they'd heard this rumor, and [the] Senator talked to some close friends, and... you know, and the way presidential things are always set up, is so the President, so you don't get yourself in a hot box with the President, you have to [let] the President know, if you get a call like this: "Oh, would you be interested?" You know, "we're looking at this," you know, ___. So if you say "No," it's Chief of Staff that got turned down, it was not the President of the United States, and the President of the United States does not get himself in [a] hot box. Now I think Bill Clinton could learn a lot from the way you work that, so that your nominees do not come up and down, and they tarnish you. But that was handled the right way. And Senator Baker, you know, thought about it, reached out to some people,
discussed it, and I think what it all came down to is that this might be a job that would be fun for a couple of weeks, because you'd learn a lot of neat things. [They always sort of been an inquisitive lot]. But then, it probably would not be that much more fun after that. Probably be a little more, and this is not to reflect on the head of the CIA, a little more pedestrian. So he turned it down. Now I give you that because that gives you a context. Because, you know, in all this time [that’s] going on, you've had discussions about, you know, "is he going to run again or not?" You know, "what's he going to do in the 88 campaign coming up?" And there [had] been some preliminary meetings, [I'd] been involved with them. Jim Cannon had been involved. Ted Welch had been, been involved.

DW: Bailey was involved, was he not, to a certain extent?

TG: Bailey was involved to a certain extent, okay. Now, not as much because there was some leftover bad-blood after Cissy's campaign.

DW: What, what was the nature of that bad blood?

TG: Well, I think it was a lot of feeling that, that everything, you know, everything had [not] been done to help Cissy. That the, that the campaign strategy really hadn't, you know, didn't work. That some of the people that Doug also consulted with, particularly in Tennessee, who should have come out and helped Cissy were not really there helping her when they should have been. There was, there [are] some residuals in there. Okay?

DW: Okay.

TG: But, I give you the CIA thing because I think you need that piece. But he had a chance [and] he turned it down. And so during this period of time, there were discussions _____ about, thinking about 88, what did you need to do? And some... some more pointed kind of conversations... than what might normally be there. Nothing that was argumentative, but could have gotten close to it, because what you had to go back and see, if you go again in 88, based on our last experience in 1980, that you're going to have the media asking you a couple of questions right out of the box: "Do you really want it this time?" Now, he was out of office. So that helped. That issue is gone. "But are you really going to do the things _____ that are important? Are you going to make those phone calls? Are you going to be standing out there shaking those hands," you know, “going until you find these,” you know,
“places that you wish you never had to go to?” You know, it's sort of like running for Sheriff in x number of counties every day of your life. Or running for County Council, I mean, that's sort of what it turns out to be. You know, "are you really ready to do that?"

And, and, and, you know, “and _____ is going to be, and, how are you going to run the campaign this time,” you know, and working with Joy, and that Joy still was not, you know, well. You know, “where do you set the head-quarters?” Because you know, part of what had gone on in, you know, in 78 and 80 was trying to make sure he got back home. Well, this time, you know, you're going to have to go out and you could not fly back home every night. And these, I'll have to be honest with you, are very, they are very difficult topics to talk about in the first place, but particularly when it's someone that you work for, work with, but you had to, had to lay lay them out there, just so he'd get a sense of what was, you know, of all the things that were going to be asked. And all the things you had to sort of, that he had to deal with himself. And, and to basically say, “Yes,” you know, “I've wrestled with this, this [or] this.” So we had had a, a meeting… at the Willard Hotel, in the restaurant there at the Willard. On the… I'm trying to remember exactly which day it was, because it was, it was during the… during the time that he got the call… the week that he got the call from President Reagan, [or] from the White House. But we'd had this meeting at breakfast. I was there, Cannon was there, and… and Ted Welch was there. And it was basically to talk through all the issues, pro and con, because he was getting ready to fly to Florida with his immediate family. You know, Derrick, Karen, Cissy, and Joy. And as a family [they] were going to sit down and talk this thing out, and he expected when he came back, over that, after that weekend… that he would… you know, basically decide yea or nay. “I'm either going,” or “I've made the decision not to go.” You'll have to tell me the day here, because I almost want to say it was that Friday morning, but I think I'm wrong. It may have been the day before. But I know they had gone to Florida, and then all of a sudden, you know, speculation starts. And I was, you know, I was at Ogilvy, _____, I was working with Jody Powell, at that point, Ogilvy and Mather, in Washington. And I think Jody's the first one that mentioned to me this, you know, he'd just heard this rumor… on the radio, and probably within… a couple of hours after that I got a call from Senator Baker that he was, you know, that he was on his way back --

DW: Did he tell you at that point what his decision was going to be?

TG: No… did not. And to this day, I never asked him. I think I know what the decision was, but I never asked him, "What would you have done, if this hadn't occurred?" But anyway, [we'd
flies] back into Washington… we got together. He flew up by himself, and left his family down in Florida, because after he went through the first round of discussions, he went back to Florida Saturday morning, as I recall, so he could, sort of bring them all back up, but, this is my reading only, I got a sense that the request to be Chief of Staff was almost like a… relief valve. And that's why I say, I never asked him what his decision was going to be. I had a sense of what it was. But this was a very real reason to basically bow out of the presidential race, saying that, "The President needs me to do this. I will put off my own presidential ambition, [my own] political ambitions, to serve the President." And… I just got a sense that it helped deal with an issue, a very difficult issue for him. I think he wanted to run, but this sort of answered it. Because as soon as it was out there, unlike the CIA thing, because I don't think he should have taken the CIA job either, I mean, there was no doubt in my mind what he ought to do.

DW: You thought he made the right decision.

TG: I _____ told him that, gave him that advice before he went over. "What would you do?" I said, "I would listen to what the President lays out, and if you're comfortable with that, take the job."

DW: Let's go back to… 1980. Baker's, Senator Baker's presidential campaign is concluded. Then, did you go back to the Tennessee office, at the conclusion of that campaign?

TG: Yes, the Tennessee office is in Washington.

DW: In Washington, right.

TG: Right, that's correct. [I] went back, at that point, as… as his Administrative Assistant?

DW: I think so.

TG: I think that's right. Yah, that's when I went back as the A.A. Right.

DW: Then about a year later… approximately, Ron leaves, goes back to Knoxville, and then you move to the Leader's office --

TG: Well we were sitting in, we were sitting in the airport, Senator Baker and myself, and, you
know, I knew Ron was leaving --

DW: Which airport?

TG: Oh, [God], I don't remember ----

DW: [An] airport!

TG: Yah, an airport. ----, and it may have been Nashville, I'm just not sure. But I asked him the question. I said, "Senator… which position would you take? Would you stay [as the] Administrative Assistant, or would you be the Press Secretary?" And I asked him ----, because in the interim period, before Ron made [his] decision that he was [coming] back to Tennessee to take the job at The Journal, I had been offered the job as the Press Secretary for Senator Chafee, from Rhode Island. And [I had] really thought about it, but turned it down with the basic point being, well, you know, Senator Chafee is a, you know, is a nice person, [is a] good Senator. But do you want to be the Press Secretary for the Senator [for] Rhode Island, or do you want to be the A.A. and Deputy Press Secretary for the, you know, for the Leader? And ----

DW: [That was] Lee Verstandig. That… Lee Verstandig was Chafee's A.A. at that time.

TG: That's correct. And, and so I thanked him and said, "No, I was going to stay with Senator Baker." So anyway, ----, I had [discussed] with Senator Baker. [He said], you know, I asked him, [and said], "What would you do?" And he looked at me, [he] said, "Well, you've got to make the decision." Because let me tell you part of what was going on here. In Washington, A.A.'s carry a certain designation, and Press Secretaries carry another one. And within the terminology, it's understandable. Not, though, in the way that Senator Baker looks at the positions. And he said, "Here's what I would tell you." He said, “You can be the AA, and that's great. But if you really want to do the job, you ought to be the Press Secretary, because that's,” you know, “that's the position that's going to be,” you know, “much closer and much more involved.” So I knew exactly what I was going to do.

DW: By that time he was the Majority Leader.

TG: That's correct.
DW: By the way, another kind of peripheral question, and I don’t know [why] you’re the first person that it’s occurred to me to ask this, I don't know why. Does Senator Baker have a hideaway, in the capitol?

TG: Yes.

DW: When would he repair there? And… what, how did he use it?

TG: Well, when I think he'd had enough of us. When he didn't want to be found. Or he'd go to the Senate gym. And you knew when he went to the Senate gym, you didn't bother him. Because usually, I mean, you knew places he went. I mean, they were cues. Going to the Senate gym was, he really just wanted to be left alone. If he went to the hideaway… just leave him alone.

DW: Yah.

TG: Because he was, or if he was in the darkroom [at home]. I mean, he went in there [and] that was, you know, you knew that. Or, I mean, or other little things. When he was in the car, if you saw his fingers tapping, you knew he was getting irritated. I mean, things like this. I mean, there were signals that if you were around him… enough that you understood some of the things that he was communicating, and when to bother him and when not. There were, there were many a good… person, who would, you know, just [had] something they just had to tell him… and whether it was Ron or whether it was me… you know, we'd, you know, we’d say, "Look, if I were you, I'd wait." "No, I've got to get the answer right now." "If I were you, I'd wait." And they'd just keep pressing, so you'd let them press, and then they'd get their head handed back to them. And you'd say, "Guys, this has nothing to do with us trying to control access to Senator Baker." Because I, I mean, I know on more than one occasion, just like Ron, on numerous occasions. "[You] guys, if you want to travel, you go do it. But you're going to find that, you know, it isn't the life of Riley." Senator Baker, I, I mean, I enjoyed traveling with him. I really did. But you get the brunt of whatever is on his mind. If somebody else had irritated him, you were going to hear it. You were going to get a laundry list of things [that] needed to be done. So it was a, but it was fun, I mean, I enjoyed it. But you had a lot of people thinking, boy, that is the best thing going, is to be out there in that role. Or you're trying to, you’re trying to, you know, sort of set up a board between me
and the Senator, [and] I'll show you. And it was nothing more than trying to say, "We're trying to give you," you know, “look, we're with him enough, and we see him enough, that we understand," you know, “how he works.” You understand the personality that's there. You understand some of the cues that are there. And all it took was one time to get your head bit off. And then, you know, they'd sort of step back, saying, "_____ you understand, now. All we're trying to do is help [you]." 

**DW:** How did Senator Baker slice, decapitate, take the head off and then hand it back? How would he --

**TG:** Well, you didn't see it very often. But [you would, it] was like a quick flash. Sort of like a big bolt of lightning. And if it happened, it would be just like that, and then, it was over…

**HS:** ____.

**TG:** Oh yah. Oh yah… _____, but it was --

**HS:** ____.

**TG:** _____, his jaw would get clenched, but, I mean, it would be a real quick, I mean, you could see it. Boy it hit, and it hit with a, with a ton of bricks. Because he normally, I mean, that's not [the part you see quite often]. But it really took a lot to get there, but if you hit it, he'd hit it straight back, and then it was gone. [It] was fine.

**DW:** Yah.

**TG:** But boy, you understood, back off. You better just, sort of, back off. Saw it a couple times with a couple of members, who I will not name, that really just got under his skin, big time. And saw it a couple of times with a couple of staff people that I will not name.

**DW:** Um --

**TG:** [But] once you saw it --
DW: You didn't want to see it again.

TG: You didn’t want to see it again, [that’s] correct.

DW: What… again on a personal note, when he went to the gym, what would he do: steam, sauna?

TG: I guess. _____.

DW: _____.

TG: Oh no, no, no, no. You don't go there. This is like the little hideaway --

DW: _____ --

TG: sanctuary.

DW: _____.

TG: You got it.

DW: Have you, have you read any of Senator Cohen's thrillers?

TG: I read part of the first one. Didn't get through it… don't put that in your book.

DW: Well, I've, I’ve read one, and then part way through another, and… when we talked to him, he said one of the reasons he wrote these things was because he could… say things about the institution in the context of a piece of fiction --

TG: Right.

DW: that he couldn't say.

TG: Right.
DW: And in this one I'm reading now, he talks about the… Senate gym, and how Senators do go there to escape their staff --

TG: That’s correct.

DW: because you, you can't get to them at all. It's impossible… Where, do you recall where you were election night 1980?

TG: In his office, _____ --

DW: Describe that scene, and what was going on there as the returns were coming in.

TG: Well, you had, I mean, you had a lot of people who spent the day just collecting phone numbers. You know, where were people going to be? And not just the campaign committee people, you know, Senator Heinz and all, all of his operation, but individual campaigns. So you had contact numbers and things like this.

DW: So you wanted to know where you could reach Steve Symms in Idaho that night?

TG: [Or] Mike Mattingly, or, or all these people. And, you know, [and] basically, I think most _____ expect you were going to be calling them, saying, you know, "You ran a good race" you know, “Don't be discouraged. You ought to think about,” you know, “next time around." And, but you had a _____ to put together, you know, again, a long list of phone numbers, contacts, you know, and it wasn’t just one number, it would be, you know, two or three numbers, so that if the campaign, you couldn't get through, here's a private number coming in, or whatever. And, you know, there was just a, I mean, probably a couple dozen people in his office that night, most of them, you know, who had been, who had been involved in the campaign… and, and after, you know, after he dropped out of the presidential race, you know, he really got very, you know, focused on going out trying to help get Senators elected, in 1980. And so, you know, most of us who were in there had been involved in, you know, some form of that. But you had Bill Hildenbrand _____, who was the… you know, the floor leader for us. I mean, just a lot of people that, you know, were involved in [his] operation… sitting [in] there. Because, [like I said], we all came in thinking we were going to get close, but [we] probably missed it by a whisker. And then as the night wore on, and we saw races that started falling in line, that… that indicated there's
something more going on here than just a normal election, then that's when people really got focused. But we all… I'm trying to remember, at what time that he got the… phone call [that], when he clearly felt we were there. It was on up in the wee hours of the night. And then the other _____ speculation after that was, is Paul Laxalt going to challenge him for Leader? And, you know, one of the first calls that came back was Paul Laxalt, D.C., saying, you know, "I'm for you."

DW:  My recollect, I… I… did, did Senator Baker have any serious concern, any serious concern that Laxalt might challenge him?

TG:  Sure. I mean, because, if you think about it, [he] was a conservative type, you were going to elect a lot more conservative type [of] Senators, [even though] we'd campaigned for a lot of them, they basically felt like they were brought in by Ronald Reagan. You had a lot of the Reagan people who felt that Howard Baker, because of the Panama Canal, you know, had not served well. Paul Laxalt was one of those who was lined up on the other side of the Canal issue, because if you recall, Senator Baker basically allowed Laxalt to sort of carry that point of view while he was supporting the Byrd amendment, the Baker-Byrd amendment, to the Canal treaties. And so yah, I think there was a legitimate concern in there, that, that this, this wave that came in, that he had never been, what you’d say, real close to a lot of the Reagan people who had come in with him, that they might want their person up in the Senate, saying, "Well," you know, “you've got a guy up there who [wanted] the Panama Canal Treaty, went the wrong way, and you've got a, you’ve got a very aggressive agenda that you’re going to try to drive, and don't you want your own person up there running the Senate?"

DW:  The impression I've had up to now is that Senator Baker initiated the call _____.

TG:  That is correct. There were a lot of back and forths _____, "Should we wait," you know, “Should we wait for the call to come from [there and the decision made]?” "No, why don't you reach out yourself _____ and do the, you know, do the first, you know, sort of feeler." And rather than waiting for it to come back, because the media was, the media [was] really trying to build this as a… as a real story. And of course, Laxalt _____ thought about it, and I think that is true. I don't think Senator Laxalt ever wanted to be the Leader of the Senate.

DW:  Were the media hanging around _____, in the corridor, at that time? Or… do you have any
recollection of that?

TG: Oh boy, I don't recall right now whether they were out there then. I think we, I mean, I know we let them know that, that we'd had the call. Because that basically took the story away. At that point, everybody said they knew he'd be Leader. But I don't recall exactly how we communicated [all] that.

DW: I understand that Senator Byrd and his people were around the corner in his office. Were there any communications between Senator Baker and Senator Byrd, that night?

TG: That night? Not that I recall. I mean, there was just pandemonium going on. As soon as we got, as soon as we got within what we thought was striking distance, I wish I could remember the two or three races that came in that clearly indicated that this was going to be a different night than we thought. Because we were winning the [ones] that we, Mattingly was one of them, [I just], that one I do know.

DW: [Bobby] Denton in Alabama would have been another. Paula Hawkins in Florida, perhaps.

TG: Perhaps. But Mattingly was a real _____.

DW: Yah, he was a _____.

TG: He was. And when that one went, everybody said, "Boy, this thing may be going different… than we thought."

DW: Um hm. What, what, what was Baker's personal reaction to what was going on, and, and the change in his role that all of this meant? How was he, what was his demeanor during, as this realization was developing?

TG: Well, I think it, I think it, while you may have thought about it and planned it a couple years in advance for what would we do if we ever controlled the Senate, _____ became a reality. And reality hits and you sort of sit there for a minute, just sort of try and take it all in. And then you immediately say, "Well, the first thing next morning we’ve got to do, we’ve got to sit down and figure out what does this mean. And how do you,” you know, “what's got to be done?” But it was, I mean, yah, I mean, I think there was an immediate sense of euphoria.
that was there, because, you know, something had occurred that nobody predicted was going to happen, _____ the Reagan election, that you'd taken the Senate. I mean, it was almost like throwing a curve ball when most people thought it was going to come straight across the plate. It didn't.

DW: Was there a meeting the next morning?

TG: Yes, there was.

DW: What do you recall about who was there and what was --

TG: Well, what I recall was that everybody was but Bill Hildenbrand. Bill had… Bill had had… one too many red wines, and got there a little bit late. But he did show up. But, I mean, the first thing _____, make sure that nothing had happened overnight to change it. But they were just sitting down sort of starting a list of what are the things are you need to do. [You know], all the way from, "What is the first," you know, “what is the first bill you [want] to put in?” To, you know, “Now you're going to have to [be appointed] Secretary of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms,” a lot of those kinds of positions. “You're going to have X number of patronage-type jobs that now come over.” “You're going to have to look at committee ratios,” you know, “Are you going to… change them? Are you going to get rid of Democrat staff and replace them with Republicans? Or add them on top of it?” A lot of those kind of, of issues that, that became much more focused on, you know, and then parcel them out. Who [was] going to have responsibility for which piece of it?

DW: Um hm. So it was --

TG: Of course, the first issue was making sure that the Laxalt issue, you know, was put to rest. That there was not a Laxalt issue. I mean that, you had to get that nailed, before it took on life of its own

HS: Yah.

DW: So the basic people there were _____ you and Ron and [Jim] Cannon --

TG: Cannon… Leavengood.
HW: Hildenbrand, Leavengood.

TG: Um… Marty Gold… John Tuck. [I mean, that’s] --

HW: Howard Green.

TG: Howard Green. No, Kenny wasn't there at that point, because Kenny, Kenny was… Kenny was the Number Two to Friedersdorf, so he was not running the, the congressional liaison [shop], at that point.

HW: Um… excuse me, were you going to say something?

TG: Yah, I was going to say, that _____, within a, within a couple days after that, and I don't think it was the first day, you had Tennessee calls [that started coming, saying], "Well, now you've become Majority Leader, does that mean he's going to forget Tennessee?" Or, conversely, "What _____, [Tennessee] is not going have a problem, because now, you know, he's the Majority Leader, so nobody is going to tamper with that, or the Breeder Reactor." [I mean], we had the Tennessee listed issues that came up that you had to wrestle with.

HW: May I?

TG: Oh, go right ahead.

HW: What do you recall about that… six weeks, or two months, _____ six weeks, what was going on between the time of the election and the time the new Congress was sworn in? A series of meetings, preparation, anything that stands out?

TG: No, nothing that just sort of… leaps out. I mean, because I, I think that, I _____ can remember more of the first couple of months when we were in the Majority than the prep time coming up. It was, it was just sort of… finalizing those details. Now I think there is a couple of things in retrospect that we… one in particular I don't think we did right. And then, and then just those first couple of months. Bob Byrd was clearly going to show, "Well, you may have gotten the Majority, you may be Majority Leader, but I still know how to run
this place." And it took us a while to, you know, understand all the ins and outs. I mean, Bob, Bob Byrd is a, Senator Byrd is a good parliamentarian, and understands all the Senate rules. And, and yah, we fumbled a little bit, here and there, but we got up to speed pretty quick.

DW: What were the, what was that thing that… you didn't… make the correct call on?

TG: We did not, we did not spend the right amount of time and the right focus on talking to these new members, many of them [who had] have never run for public office before. First thing they had been elected to, of telling them what they [needed] to do to get re-elected. You know, we were, we were new, had new majorities, so you're trying to get people office space, and you're trying to take care of this issue, and get them on this committee or whatever. And, by not spending enough time, with somebody sitting down and saying, "You've got to communicate back to your constituents. You've got to do your constituent mail." You know, “You’ve got,” I mean, those kinds of things are important. And when it really came home to roost was six months into it, when you went around Senator Denton's office, and the mail was stacked up around the window. Because they still hadn't figured out how to answer the mail. They didn't get their computer system [in] and stuff like this. And, and the reason I know is, I ran the Senate Campaign committee when most of, when these people came up for re-election. And they got beat. And they got beat and, I mean, it was, it was a, within 14-15,000 votes switched, we would have [held] the Senate. And you were losing by, you know, one percentage-point, things like this. And a large part of it is that… not just tough votes [that] they'd cast, but they really had not gone back and done the work back home. And, I mean, we had, we had a, Senator Baker's got a little group that [has] continued to get together with him off and on. And I spoke my piece when everybody was talking about, "Well, boy, now we've got the Senate and we've got the House,” you know, “we ought to do this and that." And _____ was getting all sort of tied up in a lot of the details, and at that point, I, you know, I braced the Senator, and I said, "Well, I hope we learned [one] lesson, you know, from 1981." And Senator Baker said, "What's that?” I said, "We've got to sit down and get people to understand why they got here and how they come back." We did not do that right. And I didn't say it to slam one [of] the people in particular [who was] sitting at the table, who [clearly] that was something he should have been focused on. I don't think he took it [too] personally, but he took it a little bit that way. But it was, I mean, we did not do the things that we should have. We did not sit back and, [and] again, I think, because of all the stuff we had to deal with… you know, that was not [at] the
top of anybody's list. It was just, we've got to get this place up and running.

DW: Um hm.

TG: And it was only, you know, after the fact that, that you saw that we really didn't do the political kind of work we should have to get these people [to] understand what, you know, what needed to be done. And that was corrected. I mean, it's much more focused now. Helping these people understand that you get here, you've got to figure out what do you do beginning day one to get yourself re-elected, if you want to come back.

DW: I want to come back to that in a moment, but… Jim Range said that there was a conscious decision made in about this time. Of course, he was coming over to take Howard's place, who was going to become Sergeant at Arms. To sort of keep a small, lean, leadership staff, as opposed to expanding and creating something like the staff of the Democratic Policy Committee --

TG: Correct.

DW: in the Leader's office.

TG: Correct.

DW: And to try to utilize the committee staff as an extension of the Leader's staff.

TG: Right.

DW: Could you comment on that?

TG: Sure. That's, that's correct. But I think the other part of it is that I'm not sure, nor is Senator Baker, that he would, he would have wanted to replicate what Senator Byrd had in place. Number one: That he was not looking, I mean, if you think about his style, Senator Baker's style isn't to try to hammer, you know, hammer you down and to make you do something. It's more of consensus building. And the way he set up his, you know, his style to manage the Senate… came off that same mind set, that I'm going to try to use my committee chairmen… get them involved in decision-making. He continued the, you know, the…
meetings that he'd had as Minority Leader, with the ranking members, he just continued them, you know, with the committee Chairmen, where they meet with him directly that way. And so you had, you know, all the Cardinals sitting in the room. But basically you didn't have them under the Leader's thumb, through this Policy staff kind of thing. And we had also made a decision, you know, that what we wanted to do was to, was to reduce the size of staff in general. And, so why would you go out and create a whole brand new group of people? Now, maybe in retrospect, one of the things that, that we should have done, is maybe we should have tried [to figure out a] way that you'd disband the Democratic Policy Committee. Because what you kept there was a lot of institutional memory. I mean, we had people becoming, I mean, they had been staff directors for a ranking member, but that's not the same as being the Committee Staff Director. And what you left in place was a lot of the Democrats you knew, you know, staff-wise, how to run the place. And, you know, and why they didn't go out of their way to ding us… they would find opportunities and sort of take a bite out of you here and there. And…as somebody said, you know, “Republicans are too nice. They don't come in and clean house.” I think Newt Gingrich learned a lesson. He cleaned house. You basically, sort of, you know, [leave] these people in, you just sort of add your people on top of them. And that's what we did. We really did not fundamentally change the Democratic structure that was there. And, so you had people left in place who, you know, knew the committee system, knew how it worked, they'd been running it for years, and who clearly did not like being in the minority. I mean, it’s, that is not fun.

DW: In other words, you're suggesting it might have been a good idea for, for… with the support of Senate [leaders]… of… the Republican leadership, for let's say, Senator Hatch to do some house cleaning on the Labor Committee. Say on the Democratic side --.

TG: _____ You had X many committee staff positions you can fill… but also, I think it's important here, relationships that were there, that had been built over time, were built off of a minority… group of Senators and staff people having to deal with the majority. So you built good relationships there. So when it flipped over, and the people who had been in the minority previously, were now in the majority, clearly still wanted to preserve some of those relationships, because they had been beneficial to them over the years. And that was hard… to sit there and say, "Well," you know, “you helped me when we were there. I'm there now, so I'll wipe you out, because we're in control." And [so] you had a lot of that factor in here. And again, knowing Senator Baker, it would, it would fit more with his style, his way of doing things… if you left it that way.
DW: In, in regard to… the re-election problem that you mentioned, and this is something that I want to go into more extensively later, but you kind of, obviously you had kind of a fragmented structure… for dealing with that particular problem. You had the Leader's office, of course. You had the Campaign Committee --

TG: You talking about the 78 campaign now? _____.

DW: No, no, no. I'm talking about… the problem of hanging on to the gains that were made in 80 --

TG: Oh, okay --

DW: and [in] 86.

TG: Right.

DW: You had the Leader's office, under both Senator Baker and Senator Dole. You had the… Campaign Committee and its staff.

TG: Right.

DW: Then you had the Conference Committee and its staff.

TG: Right.

DW: I mean the Conference and its staff, interested in the political forces of the members --

TG: Right.

DW: and it seems to me, very little integration. And I think this is what you were talking about, during that point in time.

TG: Yes, M'am.
DW: To go back to that transition period in... the... November and December of 1980, do you recall any conversations that Senator Baker had with Senator Byrd during that time, as to the transition, handing over the reins of control with the Senate?

TG: No, I don't. I don’t.

DW: Yah. Of course, your major responsibilities were still in the Tennessee office --

TG: That’s correct.

DW: at that time. When, do you recall when you first heard the term "reconciliation" used in a serious kind of way?

TG: Oh, boy. I want to say in a meeting in Senator Baker's basement in his house.

DW: I know there was a dinner early in January, that he had with Jim Baker and Stockman --

TG: Right.

DW: Regan, Domenici, Hatfield, Dole, I think were the principals. And... I know the idea of reconciliation was discussed then, but I don't know what led up to that --

TG: Now I'm trying to remember, too. And this is [why I’m] going to be vague, and [probably not going] to help you out.

DW: Sure. It was a long time ago.

TG: But I think, I mean, as I recall it, [I] thought there was a meeting in his, in the basement of his house when it was first sort of... cooked up... that this might be a way to do it. To achieve the things Reagan wanted to achieve and get them all out there at one time, rather than, because that was the real trouble: _____ how do you get the things done that Ronald Reagan campaigned for, and that he said that he was going to accomplish within the procedures that the... the legal process gives you, to get there. And that's where this whole notion sort of _____. I mean, I don't want to say that Stockman created it, but I know he was involved on the launching pad of this thing.
DW: Well, really, all I know at this point is that… Senator Byrd and the Democrats had used reconciliation for the first time… in the way in which it was used in 81, in 1980. The Budget Committee required some of the authorizing committees and the Appropriation Committees to make some cuts.

TG: Right.

DW: And I've read that in terms of promoting the idea of the use of reconciliation in 81 as a device to get the Reagan agenda on track, that Steve Bell, and then Bell through Domenici, was a major advocate of this particular approach.

TG: Yeh, he was an advocate, but I'm trying to think [when it] first really came to be. But I, I mean, there’s something in my mind that says Stockman was involved early on, in the whole notion of, of using this device… to get. I want to say it was in a meeting in the basement of Senator Baker's house in Washington where this thing really sort of came to life.

DW: Okay, well I can check that out further. Let's talk a little bit about the nature of Senator Baker's basic commitment to Ronald Reagan, and the Reagan program. I know that he said early on that he was going to be Ronald Reagan's spear carrier in the Senate.

TG: After making a decision, though. There was --

DW: ____.

TG: there was a fork in the road.

DW: Okay.

TG: You can either be Ronald Reagan's point person in the Senate, or you could, you know, you could be a William Nolan --

DW: Um hm.
TG: the last Majority Leader [that had been] in the Senate, where he basically did not carry the Eisenhower agenda. And, and you had those choices to make. And… Senator Baker made a… very clear choice, but I think the, the choice that fit him. Because I cannot see Senator Baker as the guy out there, you know, who is going to take on the Reagan agenda, because, [I mean], that's what people had voted for, [they'd] endorsed, the _____ Senator's been elected. If he had put out a stake that I'm going to oppose this president, or I'm going to be my own person… then I think it would have been very tough. But to make the conscious decision… and to reflect back on Nolan and how he'd done it, to say, "My," you know, "I'm going to be the President's spear carrier in the Senate," _____ was a conscious decision he made.

DW: Could another consideration have been Senator Byrd's… example in his relations [when] the Carter Administration, when he seemed to kind of follow the Nolan model. Perhaps not to the extreme, but he maintained a certain independence… of the Carter Administration which was strongly resented, as I'm sure you're aware, in certain, [certain quarters].

TG: Sure, _____. I mean, [you will decide then]. I, I really think that, that it was a fundamental decision he made. How did he want to work? What did he think the issues were? How should he work them? The people that had, you know, [who] were new in the Senate, what would they expect [of me]? All that wrapped together, _____ I think is very clearly the reason he got to where he got to. He looked at which way, you know, which ways, you know, do I want to be perceived? And I think [clearly he looked at it that] he was not a Bill Nolan. [Couldn’t] work it that way.

DW: Now, the next, my next question is… to what this… decision meant operationally. What was the essential nature of the commitment? Was it… to the Reagan Administration in the large sense, or was it to Ronald Reagan in Reagan's legislative objectives in a more personal, limited and personal sense?

TG: Well, I think it was more to the fundamentals of what this President wanted to achieve… and lining up with those. It doesn't mean that you didn't have input, or you didn't work out strategies with Jim Baker and others in the White House to make it happen, but it was just, it was a clear understanding that if Ronald Reagan, you know, ran to cut taxes and to cut spending, then I'm going to help him figure out how to do it. You know, if he wants a strong defense I'm, you know, I mean, there were, most of those issues were not things that
Senator Baker had an issue with. But let me give you an example of where he worked it back the other way, is when the Voting Rights Act came up for renewal. You know, he clearly lobbied the, not only the President's senior staff, but the President directly, you know, asked him to go to a, you know, to an NAACP meeting, where Ben Hooks was there, and the President. It was not the warmest reception he got, but he went. But it was, but that's when coming back saying, "This is an issue where," you know, “fundamentally I know where you are, and,” you know, “there's no reason that we shouldn't be able to work this one out.” So it was not a lack of putting his, his sense back in of things needing to be done. [On] the Social Security issue when it came up and the President wanted to, you know, to do something, you know, to reform Social Security, and the [Senator’s comment], he'd read, you know _____, he'd said this, you know, several times, that, you know, _____, "Mr. President, [it's a great speech] you can't deliver it, because, you know, the country isn't ready to go down this path for Social Security." So it doesn't mean giving up all [of] the things and all [of] your political [antennae] of what you think would work. But it means on the fundamentals of that agenda… that he was going to be the President's person, _____ give the President the best advice and counsel he could.

DW: Did this kind of commitment create any major problems for Senator Baker with his colleagues?

TG: Oh… yah, off and on. And it was more after the first set of votes, because if, if you go back and look at it, you know, we talked about the first real challenge was on the Reconciliation Bill where we cast, [what]… fifty-one votes, forty whatever to whatever the numbers were, forty-two times whatever, to knock off Democratic [amendments], many of them which were, were tough to restore, some of the cuts and things were in there. But that was a real test if the majority was going to hold together. And you got over it, because it was a real challenge. I mean, the Democrats are not going to put any votes up on the board. They were going to force Senator Baker's [lever] for this President. So it was key, [and] it was a test [of] his leadership, if he could do it, because he basically, again, he had staked himself out, he put all of his, you know, his chips on the President and his agenda, and so if he had failed, then he would also, it would have been, I think, a potential failure as a leader, you know, as the new leader of the Senate. But then, out of that we had votes that came up, [like] we had to extend the debt limit shortly thereafter, and we had a lot of those new freshmen sitting around that table, saying, "I ran," you know, “opposed to this." And I can recall, you know, Strom Thurmond coming in and [basically] sitting down with, you know,
the Don Nickles, the Steve Sims _____, and all these people saying, "Look, I've," you know, "I've never voted for a debt limit, either, but we're now in a position where we've got to govern, and [you guys] support this." Or the AWACS vote that came up shortly after the arms sale. Where, you know, we won that one by the skin of our teeth. So there were a lot of issues like that. Then, _____, as things went on, [when] the economy didn't bounce back [up], people had expected, and we lost... seats... in the off-year election, and Tip O'Neill became [a] much stronger player, and then you really had to deal between Senator Baker and Tip O'Neill to get things done. There were a lot of people then who sort of [found], "Well, we need to go back and undo some of the things we did in 1981. And, so, there was, you know, a lot of grumbling. The defense issue clearly was a problem, where we almost blew up a, a whole, you know... budget plan... in 1983, where we were negotiating directly, you know, down at the White House, you know, [and] Tower was holding out _____ with Weinberger, because he wouldn't take the defense cuts that were there. And the whole thing almost blew up. You had Mark Hatfield, [you know], out there on the other end. So, _____, it wasn't all smooth sailing, but I think that first set of votes were critical. If you had not passed that, I'm not sure we could have passed much of anything.

DW: When Senator Baker was faced with a... tough proposition such as those... votes on reconciliation, where he was winning fifty-one to 40 some-odd, and, in other situations like that, what was his basic approach to... pulling the necessary votes together? How did he go about doing that?

TG: Well, you know, [if] it were a real tough vote, you know, [the] more you basically just sit back and... and _____ come down to a fundamental thing. We've got a chance to show we can, you know, we can run this place, we can, you know, that, Republicans can govern... that this isn't just some quirky thing, and therefore you've got a responsibility, and you're going to cast some tough votes, many of them which maybe historically you've been on the other side, but you're in a different position now. Committee chairmen... sitting down with them, saying, you know, "You're a chairman now. And with that comes added responsibility. How do you expect some of these other members to follow if you split off?" And so there's a lot of that kind of coercion that went on. But you [had to tell them], "And we can't count on the Democrats helping us at all. They're not going to do it." On the debt limit, for example, we knew there were going to be Democrat votes, but we had to put the requisite number on the board first, before the Democrat votes had come in.
DW: So a lot of, a lot of one-on-one --

TG: Right.

DW: Appeals. Um --

TG: Senator Baker would always say, you know, somebody would say, "Well, give me the [head] count." And... you know, he'd get whip checks, and stuff like this. His whip check was, he said, "I want to talk to [the] Senators eye to eye." He said, “because if you look at them that way and they give you their word, [then] you know the vote's good." And ninety-nine percent of the time he was right.

DW: Talk about, a little bit about his ability to read other people and understand what makes other people tick. Other Senators.

TG: Yah, well... let's use Senator Helms as an example. A lot of people would have a hard time working with [him]. I mean, we used to say, "Here's how Baker can balance Javits on one [hand] and Helms on the other, and bring it together, and get things done," because you had the two poles, then, within the Republican Senate. But with Jesse Helms, you know, Senator Helms would be, you know, might be adamant on a particular issue, and may have attached it to a piece of legislation that was not necessarily germane to what, to what he’s looking for, but he had attached it. And a lot of people would get exasperated. You know, a lot of people would, you know, get angry, and Senator Baker ____, you know, _____ he had the patience of Job. But with Senator Helms, he could sit down and they could talk it through, and say, you know, you know, "Jesse, what is it you’re really looking for?" And he found the vote that he was looking for, get him that vote, then... the rest of it was done. But a lot of people would not get to that point. They would just get so tied up in knots, you know, [they’d] get angry. But Senator Baker would just sit down and say, "Tell me what," you know, “what is it you really need? Is there a vote you're looking for? A couple of votes? If so, let's get those scheduled in. Now, once we get those, are you prepared to let us go ahead to final passage?" And the answer, you know, most of the time was, "Yah." He was looking for a particular issue that he needed a vote on, for whatever reason. But that took a lot of patience to get there, and a lot of people would just, you know, want him to _____, "Why do we have to put up with all this?" And I think back to that lame duck session, which was a grueling time that we went through. Everybody told us, "Don't have a
lame duck." You know, because we had it after that first off-year election. You don't want to bring [him] back. You know, you're not sure how the election is going to go. And sure enough, it went bad. And, and so you had the Democrats in playing from a stronger hand, even though their members weren't in there, yet, but the whole attitude, it permeated. there's a shift… in American population _____ the American public toward what they want. And… a lot of very contentious issues during that lame duck session. We finally got it done. But, you know, somebody, you know, because as I recall, one of the statements in there [wasn’t] directed toward Senator Baker, it was Senator Helms or Senator Simpson. And Senator Simpson made the statement about playing stickball. [And] it was a very, very… tough, you know, remark that most Senators do not say on the floor, but it was very apparent that he had had enough. And I think --

DW: Now what was the context of that? I've forgotten.

TG: Well, the context was he was going to hang up the gas tax. And that's really why we were there.

DW: Right.

TG: And I think [there], to this day ______. I think for several years after that, issues that were important to Senator Helms, like the tobacco industry, where he lost some support, from people who were that angry over how dug in he was. And taking him down and making him stand there and have to deal with, you know, procedural things and things like that that they just felt like were unnecessary at that point.

DW: Let's talk about, a little bit more about that lame duck session, just a little bit. First of all, you, what do you recall about the… negotiations between Senator Baker and Speaker O'Neill… [in]… that led to the… the agreement that was the basis of the legislation, that is to say, a five cent gas-tax increase to fund jobs, as it were. Would seem to be the… the… the single thing that opened up the door for the legislation to pass. Do you have any recollection of [what was going on there]?

TG: ______. I can't recall a lot, I just know there were a lot of meetings that were held. Most of them were on the House side of the Capitol, in one of the rooms off the… the main corridor, where you had the key, you know… people, on the House side, the Democrats, and on the
Republican’s] side, _____ the Senate. You had a lot of the House Republicans who, I mean, I think that’s when it became very apparent that the House Republicans, you know --

END OF SIDE ONE

TG: [He] was trying to figure out, how do you [marry] up a majority in the Senate, the Republicans, and the minority in the House, the Republicans? They came at it from a different point of view. I mean, this, I mean, we were seeing the very beginnings of what, what happened in, in 1992, in 94. Because Gingrich was, you know, was on the scene, and they were clearly staking out, you know, fairly, you know, hard positions that their job is to be the loyal opposition. I mean, to be, you know, to throw a wrench into, into things rather than [figuring] out how do you get them done. Bob Michael, who was the Minority Leader, was much more of a person, I'd say, along the Howard Baker school of thought. And, but he, you know, that, I mean you knew at that point that if, that this group at some point was going to, you know, basically run the House, whether they'd be running as majority, whether they'd be running it as the [lower] opposition. But that these early signals were there, because they were much more adamant on, "We can't give them,” you know, “any ground. We can't support them.” And, you know, _____ you had the outs sort of sitting there saying, "We're [sort of] being left out of this negotiation between Tip O'Neill and Howard Baker.” Once the deal was made, and Drew Lewis [was] involved, U.S. Transportation Secretary, then you had to come back and sell it. And that's why, you know, the votes and things, where you, where you might lose the Republican vote here or there, were very, very critical, in the Senate, because you had Democrats in the Senate that were somewhat, you know, felt put upon, because they had been cut out… of these discussions.

DW: So you had a filibuster _____ a continuing resolution waiting in the wings that you had to pass, to conclude the session, and you had… five Republican senators: Helms, East, Gordon Humphrey, Nichols. Make it four. Those were the four principals.

TG: Was D'Amato involved or not?

DW: I don't think so.

TG: I'm trying to remember.
DW: Um... no, he was not, he was not involved. But it was, it was those four, basically, who were leading the charge. Do you have any recollections of what Senator Baker and his people tried to do during that period of time, to... get these guys to shut it down?

TG: I do not. I don't recall. I just know it was, I mean, there were moments when we thought this whole thing was going to fall apart. And then after we had our problems [with] the House, I mean, I mean [the] Speaker had, you know ______ a filibuster, I mean it was not a cake walk over in the House, either, when he got there.

DW: I think it was... in the Senate, the matter was resolved. I don't know whether you were... at the Capitol when this happened. I think it was 01:20 in the morning of December 1st --

TG: I was there.

DW: And Senator East was, had the floor. And Senator Murkowski was in the Chair, and Senator East asked Murkowski to rule whether a quorum was present. And Murkowski immediately ordered the Clerk to call the roll. And East was protesting that he did not request a quorum call, he simply asked for a ruling. Nevertheless, a roll call went on and was completed, and at the end of the quorum call, as he was empowered to do, Murkowski recognized Rudman. Therefore East lost [support] and the filibuster was concluded.

TG: Right.

DW: Was this just a happy accident, or --

TG: Yah. It was a mistake.

DW: ______ some sense ______ something that was planned?

TG: No, it was a mistake, plain and simple.

DW: Um --

TG: Because, see, I, I can vaguely see this whole thing, you know, happening, and then his people were livid... for the very reason you point out. _____ I didn't remember all the
details, but they were livid. But they had made a mistake. And [then part of it was] the fact that they were… they were less skilled… in the rules. They made a, they made a tactical error. They really did.

DW: I'm just guessing that Bob Dove was sitting there and… realized the situation, and [so, Hart] advised Murkowski as to what to do.

TG: I'm sure that happened. I have no doubt that it was, when the opportunity came, it was taken.

DW: Yah. Go back… to Senator Reagan's, no, “Senator Reagan’s,” Senator Baker’s relations with the… Reagan Administration. As his 4 years as Majority Leader with Reagan… developed, how would you describe the personal relationship that developed between Baker and Reagan?

TG: I think there was a… I think there was a level of respect… that developed… for both of them. I think… [on the side], I mean, keep in mind _____, during the period of time is when the. When the World's Fair thing came up, and that was very important to Senator Baker. Very important decision that the President made to go down there. And I think that was a signal of, of the, of a relationship that was there. I think they came to trust each other. I think the President clearly would, would listen to Senator Baker's advice… and counsel, [and] would take it into consideration. And I think Senator Baker had an appreciation that Ronald Reagan really did have a set of hard convictions, what he called a "central core of convictions," that drove him. And that… that this man really, you know, that's what he was focused on.

DW: _____. They had the regular leadership-meetings in the White House.

TG: Right.

DW: Did you have occasion to attend any of those?

TG: I would, you would very seldom sit in the actual meeting, but I would always go down to the White House with Senator Baker. So when he came out, we would debrief real quick, because there was always a Press entourage to catch him. And so, I was there to go out with
him to the Press, and then sort of assist him with all that.

DW: What was the nature of the debriefing, [and] how would you, what would be your role when he was talking to the Press?

TG: Well, _____ he would come out _____ what's on the Press, you know, the White House Press Corp's mind out there waiting for him.

DW: You would be [chatting it up, and] --

TG: Yah, just [wander] around, just see what's going on. And [then] when he came out, say, "Okay, here's what they [wanted] to find out." _____ can decide _____ “the car and go back up, or do you want to go over and talk to them.” Or, ____. "Here's what the White House wants me to say." Well, Yah, but—let's sort of… take it a little bit differently, because, you know, our job isn't just to do the White House's bidding with the media, but is also to make sure whatever we do or whatever is said plays back up with what we've got to worry about.

DW: Um hm.

TG: So it was those kind of, we'd do a, you know, a very quick rump session when he'd come out of there, just sort of talking through, you know, what had came up, what came up, what the, what the media was focused on then… how to position what, you know, what [you then said] and whether you go out and talk to them or not.

DW: During that time… was there an art… to communicating with the President? Were there certain ways you could communicate with him, and ways that you ought not to try to communicate with him… in meetings such as, such as those where you are talking about legislative strategy and what could be done, and what couldn't be done?

TG: No, not really. I mean, Jim Baker was a very good Chief of Staff. I mean, he did a lot of the detail work. I mean, between Baker and [Dick Darden, and] people like this, he had a good core group of people who were, who would do a lot of the leg work. But no, you'd lay out, "Here's the dynamics of this. Here's what's going on. Here's how we think the vote's going to go. _____ Democrat help or not. What the key issues are we have to wrestle with.” _____, it was a fairly, [you know], succinct, you know, outline of, of, you know, the issue or
issues that were being dealt with.

DW: What was the nature of Senator Baker's working relationship with Jim Baker?

TG: I mean, very professional and very personal. I mean, they liked each other, respected each other. [You know], he used to call Jim Baker OB, for Other Baker, _____ always says, you know, you know, "Get _____ OB," so that, you know, there was some distinguishing _____ there, but they clearly would have --

DW: The relationship between the two Bakers.

TG: Right --

DW: HB and OB.

TG: That's right. And it was, you know, _____, so Senator Baker did nickname him that, you know, “OB.” And, and then it stuck with him. But, but they would, you know, _____, they had both a personal and a professional, you know, relationship. They respected each other. They would disagree on strategies, from time to time. But they would _____ sit down and iron them all out. But, but Senator Baker really had not, I mean, he knew Jim Baker had _____ spent that much time with him. Clearly Jim Baker had been involved with George Bush, previously, and, [but] none of those issues came, you know, into play _____. "Well, can I trust him or not?" I mean, they worked together very well, very smoothly, and, and Jim Baker was able to deliver. You know, _____ they’d sit down and have a discussion about, "Okay, here's what I need, up here, to help you with your legislation." I cannot, nothing comes to my mind, immediately, that says Jim Baker was not able to deliver what he committed to get done.

DW: Senator Baker might say, "I need so-and-so to come down and talk to so-and-so."

TG: Or, "I need a letter," to somebody that guarantees them that this would be looked at or whatever. And --

DW: Or, "Your support for a particular amendment," or something of that sort.

TG: Right. Jim Baker’s very tactical… very tactical.
DW: How often would they talk… while legislative business was being conducted? Daily? Several times a day?

TG: Several times, I mean, it, you know, depended on what was going on --

DW: Is it true there was, they had a direct line

TG: Yes, they did.

DW: between ______ offices?

TG: Sure did.

DW: Going back to… the Reagan relationship, there were the leadership meetings, both Republican and bipartisan. Then, in the normal course of the events, under what other circumstances would Senator Baker directly talk business with the President? Did that happen frequently, or would he generally be working through Jim Baker and people [like that]?

TG: Well, [a lot of times it would] be working through Jim Baker.

DW: Yah.

TG: But if he needed the President directly, he would call and he would get him. But he was selective in using that, you know, because the line that he had was a White House line. It was put in on his phone. And, so he could call in and get the White House operators straight through, and they knew it was Senator Baker calling in, but, but he was, you know, he was very guarded in the things that he asked the President to do directly. Always wanted to make sure Jim Baker was in the loop, and I think that’s, I think it served him well when he came down as Chief of Staff. He understood… how that needed to work, and how President Reagan worked best.

DW: Some of the discussions of how the White House was… set up, particularly in 81 82, talk about the triumvirate of Baker, Deaver and Meese, and my impression is that in terms of
legislative business, that Deaver and Meese were not players, really. It was Jim Baker --

TG: Correct.

DW: who was handling Hill matters.

TG: Right.

DW: Is that correct?

TG: That's correct.

DW: How does [the] Vice President Bush fit into… what was going on in the Senate?

TG: He would, he did use his office and lobbied members that he knew… which was helpful. I mean, you know, he'd reach out to Senator Baker, and if there was a list [of people] to work on, you know, he would work those. He came to the, to the Tuesday policy luncheons quite often. He would preside if he, you know, if they needed him up in the Chair. That's normally how it worked. He was not necessarily involved in a lot of the strategy meetings that went on, other than, you know, the White House meetings, yes, he was there sitting next to the President. But a lot of the meetings in Senator Baker's office, you know, he was not a, you know, a natural attendee or a natural invitee.

DW: What was Susan Alvarado's… job, as it were?

TG: Her job was sort of to… take the pulse of what was going on and try to keep the Vice President at some level of awareness… of what [was going on in] --

DW: [Are you a] tennis player, by the way?
TG: I used to be.

DW: I asked that because… when we talked to Susan, she suggested [that] we do it out at her club, and after we did our interview, she and I went out and played tennis.

TG: [Oh, I see, right.]
DW: And, she wanted to include… in the interview, which we did and it was very interesting, some commentary on… the role of tennis in… Capitol Hill politics, and what you can learn about people on the Hill from playing tennis with them.

TG: There would be some people who say golf does the same thing, ______.

DW: Depends on your preferences, right?

TG: That's correct.

DW: What about the working relationship, relationships between the Leader's office and the White House liaison people?

TG: They spent more time on the House side, because you did not control the House. I think they looked at Senator Baker as knowing more about… how to set-up [an] issue, how to get members to support an issue, and… so, while we got, you know, _____ support, quite often it was more of ancillary, once Senator Baker identified what he needed, you know, what issue [it was], he wanted to work, what he needed done. I mean, there were a couple of times _____ you'd see the white anger, you saw it a couple of times toward some of the White House congressional people, because they would go and meddle with one of his members before he knew about it, and that would really get him. He'd say, "Why did you do this?" You know, "Why were you out here talking to this person ______." And you just saw it a couple of times, but it was a very different style, working with him, as sort of taking a lead off of Senator Baker and his staff people, compared to what went on in the House, where you really, I mean, they spent more time working Rostenkowski and people like that [over] on the House side than they did on the Senate side.

DW: I get the impression, talking to people like Pam Turner and Powell Moore, that, number one, they felt that they had free and open access to Baker's office --

TG: That Is correct.

DW: and were always welcome.
TG: Right.

DW: And... this may be overstating what they were reporting, but it seems as though they felt that they worked as much for Senator Baker as they did for anybody else.

TG: I would agree with that, [right].

DW: When they were working an issue on the Senate side.

TG: [Yep]. Because they [were basically] following his lead. I mean, he laid out where he [thought] the votes were, and [how] his strategy [that] needed to get done. So, _____ saying, "Okay, here's our checklist, here's how we've got to go... you know, here's who you've got to go talk to." And they would _____, [and they would] get some [intelligence gathering] coming back, saying, you know, "Well, so-and-so needs this from the White House." And they'd figure out they [can] make the call to get it done, or is this one where he had to pick up the phone himself? _____ important enough to do it.

DW: Let me ask you about, to comment on his... his relationship with several other people. David Stockman.

TG: I think he was, I think he was generally fascinated with Stockman. Thought he was brilliant. Got a good mind. I also think he felt... that he was totally misled.

DW: That he, Baker, was misled by Stockman, in those budget discussions --

TG: Sure.

DW: Did they talk fairly frequently?

TG: Well, ____. Stockman would spend more time talking with Domenici and Bell, because they were on the budget side. But yah, I mean, he would come up with Jim Baker quite often. But, you know, Senator Baker's primary contact was always going to be Jim Baker.

DW: Um hm.
TG: Not David Stockman.

DW: Okay, and some Cabinet members. Don Regan.

TG: He worked well with Regan. Regan would get the things done needed to as Treasury Secretary. And so, you know, it was a good relationship there.

DW: Hague and then Schultz.

TG: Well, Hague he had come down and play tennis, in Huntsville, for a weekend. I think he liked Al Hague. I think he was always intrigued by Hague's role in Watergate. So I think there was always a fascination there.

DW: Do you have any particular recollections about... Hague's confirmation? Course, you were not, you were still basically over in the State Office then, I think. This would have been January 81. You had not quite made the move, then, had you?

TG: No, but I do remember that in how _____ the issues being put together.

DW: Cause I asked that because... the Democrats were trying to raise the Watergate issue --

TG: Correct.

DW: and... Senator Baker seemed to keep a closer watch over that, those proceedings than he did a lot of the other stuff that was going on at that time.

TG: Oh yah, because there were early, I mean, you always look for first tests for this White House. What is going to be the first challenge? And those first few challenges, you had to be able to win them. You could not afford to lose one of these early on, because those politicos, you know, would have a spill-over effect. And, that the Hague nomination was the first one that was a potential... problem. And it was more of taking a reading just to make sure that, you know, this nomination was going to go through and [it's] not going to be submarined.

DW: What about Schultz?
TG: Schultz _____ much more circumspect. I think Senator Baker looked at George Schultz more in previous roles that he had seen him in. You know, more in the Treasury side, and things like that, than in Secretary of State. I think he, you know, I think he… I mean, he had a lot of respect for Schultz, but I think it's a position he’d never seen Schultz in before, when he was put in as Secretary of State.

DW: Does the Majority Leader, whether it's Baker or Dole or Byrd, have a… special role in foreign policy matters, simply by the fact of being Majority Leader?

TG: No. Not automatically. I mean, you've got to find that niche. I mean, if you think about Senator Byrd. Senator Byrd carved his, you know, niche in two areas. One, he understood all the rules, how the Senate worked, and two, did a lot on domestic stuff. I mean, if you sit back and think about it, was Bob Byrd really on the leading edge of a lot of the foreign policy issues? Not necessarily. But he really worked hard on delivering for West Virginia, delivering a lot of the, you know, more, you know, the social programs and things like that. Senator Baker [clearly] played must more, he enjoyed the foreign policy stuff. He had, you know, had been on the Foreign Relations Committee prior to that, and so [he] had a role to play there. The Panama Canal put him, you know, clearly in the middle of one. Senator Dole was much more on the Finance side. I mean, now he sort of, you know, is spending more time trying to work the foreign policy side, but if you looked at him, you would say, "Where is Bob Dole's expertise?" He's been more on the finance issues, tax issues, sort of [the world], you know, world trade, you know, and those kinds of issues, but not necessarily foreign policy per se.

DW: So it's a matter of personal interest --

TG: Sure.

DW: _____ at root.

TG: Sure.

DW: And if a Majority Leader has a personal interest in foreign policy, because of his position, he can probably exercise some substantial influence.
TG: He can. But you can still exercise [it] even if you are not, you know, that much _____ and you can do it every morning, if they still do this now, which I think they do, before the Senate comes in, you ask the Leader, "Here's the issue of the day?"

DW: Um hm.

TG: And if the Majority [Leader] of the Senate says, "Well," you know, “we're going to,” you know, “we’re going to declare war on Bosnia,” I mean, that's going to get a lot of attention, just because of the position, and the person, you know, who is making the statement.

DW: What about Weinberger?

TG: I think Senator Baker… felt that Weinberger would be the right person at Defense, because he came out of the ONB job, and all this, you know, where he was really, you know, was basically [out] turning the screw to keep the money tight. Until he got in _____ used to say, you know, ______. he used to be called Captain Knife, or Captain Shovel, because _____ just kept shoveling money in there. And it was, and it was hard for, it was hard to understand this [is] the same guy who, in previous [life] ______, you know, had been the guy just cutting money out. And now he just, you know, couldn't find enough to spend. And, and I think there was some disappointment there.

DW: Weinberger… obviously was… persistent and stubborn, and… and was not, it was difficult for him to compromise. And, which must have been… a frustration not just for Baker but for other legislators for whom --

TG: It was a frustration for a lot of the, of his Committee Chairmen who were involved in that process cause you had John Tower, [you know], hanging out there. You had the Secretary of Defense hanging out there. And you had everybody else saying, "Well, Defense has got to give a little bit if [you want us] to give this." Take the classic Mark Hatfield appropriator, and John Tower, defense… authorization. And sitting there trying to say, "______, why do I want to give up on my authority, but he won't give anything. I mean, it [was] just back and forth. And that whole 83 budget thing almost fell apart over that issue.

DW: Let's… talk now a little bit about… the basic role you played in the, in Leader's office, once
you moved over and how it evolved over the course of time you were there. Were you pretty clear as to what, as to what Baker expected of you when you made the move over?

TG: _____, fairly clear. [I mean], I knew the rules and responsibility, [and I was going to] basically pick up Ron's job. [I mean], there was nothing in Ron's job that didn’t, you know, that he moved elsewhere, you know, when I came over. [I mean], _____ you did all the press stuff, you were involved as one of his, you know, two or three strategy people. You were involved in all of _____, you know, the key meetings and things he had. Did all of his scheduling, oversaw the scheduling, his travel, you know, a lot of the issue [and] message development, things like that. And, it [revolved] in making political recommendations, you know, do this campaign, you know, don't do this one, or _____, you know, those kind of things. There was always a…there was always a slight irritant, and the irritant was there even when, you know, when Ron was in the job. Because, again, I think it’s [part] of the way Senator Baker… operates. He had Jim Cannon [who he] brought in, [you know], who had [worked for] Nelson Rockefeller on the White House staff for Ford, in domestic policy role. And I clearly, you know, my understanding early on [was] Jim Cannon was brought in to bring some level of understanding of how a national campaign is put together, and the connections he had to the money people in New York. When the campaign didn't, didn’t turn out right, you know, Jim basically stayed as Chief of Staff for the Majority Leader's office. And, and there were… things that Jim did, [these] were cross-over places, though, where the Senator clearly didn't define… who was responsible.

DW: Um hm.

TG: And I think part of what, what he did, and again I say this isn't me in the job, it's also when Ron was there, is what he liked was a little bit of this friction… that “I've got somebody outside the fold, whose judgment I,” you know, “_____ listen to, and _____ take, but I've always got somebody who is close to heartbeat of my state of Tennessee.” I think it was, I mean, if you think back [to] Senator Baker getting on the plane, you know, every other weekend, and flying [back to Knoxville] to sort of rekindle himself.

DW: Um hm.

TG: I think there was, I think part of Senator Baker will always be buried in the hills of East Tennessee. And that, you know, his instincts, his judgment, all sort of flowed from that, you
know, from that rooting. And therefore, I think he always wanted to make sure he had something, somebody around him who was rooted in that same --

DW: When you moved over did... Cannon try to... exercise some authority over your functions? I know he had... in the case of Ron, back in 77, and that of course, he didn't win that one. [But I wonder if he tried again].

TG: [No, I think that...] that issue is past. I mean, I think having Tennessee with Ron, my [mistake], because again, you’re right, I was not there, but even [to the] point of, of, I think trying to get Ron fired.

DW: [Well, I] wouldn't be surprised.

TG: As I recall, it wasn't going to happen, though. But no, we passed [through that meeting]. I mean, he and I had one challenge. And... and it's when...we had an issue... on the floor of the Senate... and I cannot recall the specific issue right now, but it's one that was sort of going back and forth. And Senator Baker was meeting with... Prime Minister Begin. And [he] was meeting over in the Tennessee office. Because he'd been over to address the Foreign Relations Committee, and he had a limited amount of time, and, so, rather than coming back to the Capitol, you know, they met there. And Senator Baker went into the meeting [and] basic instructions were, "I do not want to be disturbed." And I was over with him. Well, those were the times, 9 times out of 10, that Jim Cannon, because he's not there, Jim's going to call and say he's got to, got to talk to him. He's got to talk to him directly. So, the call came in, and... they gave it to me, and I said, you know, I said, "Do you need him?"

"Oh yeah, I've got to have this and that and that." And I said, "Well, he's in with Begin right now, and he, you know, he doesn't want to be disturbed." "I've got to talk to him." And I said, "Jim, I cannot do it." He was furious. He said, "Well, young man, we will see who is," you know, "who is in charge." And he was over in the Capitol, and I was over in the Dirksen Building. And, so Senator Baker finished, and, the issue was not that big a deal, _____ And, but it was really, it was more of a test, to see, "Well, I'm just going to call and see if," you know, "I'm going to tell you to go and get him, and you're going to get him." And I didn't do it. [So we came] out of there, and _____ walking [back to Senator Baker and I said] “I'd better tell you something that happened.” So I told him. And, I mean, Cannon was laying in wait, he really was. And he was furious at, you know, at, because here I was, this, you know, snotty-nosed kid, in his mind, you know, and he has all this
experience, [and] I basically told him, "No." And, [I mean], this thing was, I mean, it was really hot. What did Senator Baker do? He didn't go to the gym, he called [Wilbur], his driver, and said, "I'm going home to the darkroom." And he left. And [he] left the issue just sitting there. It worked itself out. But, because what he wasn't going to do was he wasn't going to get himself in the middle to pick between Jim Cannon and me. He just wasn't going to do it. [Cause in, you know], he talked to me later about it. He said, "Look," [you know], “you're both valuable, in different ways.” But he was not going to use this as, you know, he didn’t want to, I mean, [part of it was], he wasn’t going to embarrass Cannon by saying, "Well Jim, you were wrong." And he wasn't going to come back to me saying, you know, "We've got to do _____." So he just basically chose to leave.

DW: That's interesting.

TG: And it worked itself out.

DW: _____ --

TG: [But] Cannon and I were good. I mean, that all, that all worked, I mean, Jim and I are good friends, but it really was, I mean, that was the test that I went through. I'm sure. That was my test.

DW: To provide a little, what I think is a little bit of context, if I recall correctly, this… this probably occurred when AWACS was really heating up.

TG: That's correct.

DW: And, Begin had met with the Finance, Foreign Relations Committee, and he had promised, before he went in there, that he was not going to talk about the sale, and was not going to campaign against it. But he did. And that promised to screw a lot of things up that had, and I'm sure Baker considered this meeting with Begin as extremely critical, in terms of the, the AWACS program.

TG: _____, Jim Cannon, _____ an easy call, you know, when he called to demand this. And, you know, I didn’t let it go through. Because it's almost like the whole Senate was just going to fall apart, whatever the issue was on the floor at that point. And after the fact, I
talked to Howard Greene, you know, and Howard says, "It wasn't that big a deal." But [see], but I was basically running off of instincts, and while Senator Baker never said [it], I mean, I think that was, I think when he saw that I at least… hung in there. _____, it was, I mean, this was, I was not too much into this job when this happened. And, I mean, this was a pretty big, I mean, I've got this guy just vroom-m-m-m, [coming at me].

DW: It wasn't an easy decision.

TG: It was not easy. No, it was not. _____.

DW: I have read somewhere that, and I don't know [whether] it was this way from the start, that Senator Baker… had you sit in on a lot of meetings he had with individual Senators and small groups of Senators, to, as a kind of a note-taker, to get down what understandings were reached and so on [and] so forth. Is that, is that accurate?

TG: Well, not necessarily as a note-taker, but, quite often you'd be in there… you know, it was a lot of constituent meetings, too, and things like that that went on. Just, I mean, _____, one of the best ones, and I'll come back to what you've cited here, was when… an accusation was made that Senator Baker had made a commitment to Fred Smith for an NFL franchise. And Joey Alioto, [you know], was out there making this claim, you know, and Pete Roselle had come up to meet with Senator Baker, but it was about the whole repeal of the antitrust exemption for professional football. And what he was claiming was that Howard Baker had made this commitment, you know, to Roselle, in return to get a franchise in Memphis, and that was so far off the truth. But [it] was being able [to have me sit] in that meeting, to be able to come back and sort of verify, it was exactly what happened. So many times it was to sort of have a second, you know, set of eyes and ears. But also it would be to come in if, you know, if he needed to break something, you know, if it was time to [sort of] move on to something else. But you also would get a sense with him of when he wanted you there and when he just wanted to be private.

DW: How would he indicate that?

TG: You just knew it from looking at him. You could tell.

DW: Is that right?
TG: [I mean], you get it over time. And you knew if this was one where he wanted you, or if he hadn't shown up, he'd buzz over, _____ buzz over and say, you know, “ask Tommy to drop in,” because my door, [see], my door… connected right to his back office there.

DW: So in part, it was so, if there were press inquiries about what had gone on in a meeting and what was actually said, you could be able to --

TG: Correct

DW: to report… to the media. Let me go back to… relations with the Reagan Administration. There are a couple of things that I… jumped over inadvertently that I wanted to ask you about. What was your general impression of the… quality and the effectiveness of the departmental liaison people… working the Senate?

TG: It depended on the department. State Department people were, you know, were pretty good. Drew Lewis had a pretty good operation. _____. I mean, you have to [think] of the individual Cabinet Secretary, because I think it mirrored their, you know, their _____ activity with the type of person that they had.

DW: I get the impression that, talking to these people that, generally speaking, they felt comfortable with the Leader's office, and felt welcomed when they had occasion to come by, which was less frequently than the White House people because _____ --

TG: _____. Powell Morrissey would be in there quite a bit, working State Department issues. And yah, it depended on the issue at the time. _____ probably saw more of the State Department people than anybody else other than the White House, just because there were a lot of foreign policy issues, you know, during those Reagan years, that were going on. But they'd stay plugged in.

DW: Um --

TG: Stockman's people, you know, ONB had their own set of lobbyists, so you'd see Dave Swanson and other people like that quite a bit, up there.

DW: Let me ask you about, this has to do with, the question has to do with frustration that
Senator Baker may have experienced from time to time with the White House, and, I'll get at that through… reminding you of a story that… Mary McGrory had in the Washington Post in the aftermath of this lame duck session. I don’t, it was January 13, 83, and I don't know whether you remember this, but I'll just read you a few quotes. She characterized _____, this may have been after an interview with Baker, I don't know, I've forgotten. _____, Senator Baker is frustrated by the White House and, quote "indulging in an uncharacteristic primal scream," a bit of hyperbole there. And… and she's quoting, "I'm not going to take it anymore." There is a quote here that Baker often felt he was being cut off at the knees by White House hard liners, the lame duck session, [Torrey]. The low point came on December 8th, when Baker called… re the nomination, called the White House re the nomination of Robert Gregg as Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Helms had threatened to filibuster. But based on what the White House had told him, Senator Baker went ahead and moved the nomination… and… then Helms announced on the floor that the nomination probably would be withdrawn later in the day. Baker felt he was blind-sided. Do you recall that story, in?

TG: _____.

DW: What about the matter of the occasional frustration?

TG: Yah, nobody's going to get it right a hundred percent of the time. Um… well, I mean, if you go back and look at a lot of the defense stuff that was going on, that was not just, you know, minor frustration, that was big time frustration.

DW: Yah.

DW: _____, there was a high point, you know, that _____ stayed locked in my mind is… seeing that whole issue that almost, I mean, split apart his own leadership. Because they were _____, you know, they were not going to give on the defense number, they had to have it. And, everything else could be cut. It was, you know, it was tough. And I know if I spent some time, I could probably, _____, yah, there were times where you thought that you had an agreement here, and then you get into it _____ in a little bit different direction.

DW: Um… I assume that… you went with Senator Baker on his foreign trips.
TG: Yes.

DW: Let me ask you, mention a few that I'm aware of and see if you have any distinctive recollections about those. There was a, the trip to the Middle East in 1981.

TG: Right.

DW: I think Dick Fairbanks, who --

TG: Right.

DW: was in as Assistant Secretary of State, was along on that.

TG: Right.

DW: Um… any particularly… sharp… things? _____ --

TG: _____, I'll tell you one [of them, and] this is a funny story.

DW: Okay.

TG: We went to Saudi Arabia, and we had dinner at the… I don't know if they call it a palace, whatever it is, where the king lives. And Senator Baker had been told before we [get] there, "If you admire something… the King will give it to you." And there was beautiful carpets, gold everywhere, and Joy was along, and, you know, she was sort of looking at this and that. And so we sit down to dinner and they served camel's milk. And Senator Baker admired the camel's milk. The next morning we got three gigantic milk jugs sent to our hotel, which the doctor on the trip immediately confiscated and poured down the drain… for fear of what you might get. [And], of course, everybody is sitting here saying, "Why did this show up?" Well, at that point, we found out Senator Baker admired the camel's milk the night before, and so, true to form, it arrived.

DW: Well, he was lucky they didn't send a camel by Huntsville.

TG: [That is true]. That is true. But this was all a part of trying to figure out, what, you know,
trying to get a reading of the region, prior to the real Senate vote coming on the AWACS treaty. We had a CBS camera crew with us during this period of time. _____ Jones and a couple of people he picked up, who covered for CBS News over there in the Middle East, trying to, you know, to sort of do a story [on, you know, and that was] going to be a, really the first foreign policy test for this White House.

DW: Just comment in general on the way in which Senator Baker handled himself, when he was leading these delegations abroad. How did he approach the job? What was, what was he trying to do, ordinarily? How did he go about doing it?

TG: Well, he clearly was, I mean, as the Leader he was heading up the trip. But on the plane and stuff, going, I mean, he was, you know, very, you know, impersonal, because basically the people going are all people who knew each other, pretty well. I mean, you had, Senator Laxalt was there. Senator Hollings was along. I'm trying to remember who else was on the trip.

DW: I think Simpson --

TG: Right.

DW: Hatfield --

TG: Right.

DW: Um… those are additional names that come to mind.

TG: But when you go into the meetings, [you know], he’d basically would sort of… set em up, __, you know, what they’re trying to find out, and then we’d sort of evolve into a general discussion with all the members, [you know], if they wanted to ask something, or say something, but he clearly, you know, would, was in the role… as Leader, _____, because he was leading the delegation.

DW: How did he get ready for these trips?

TG: Got a lot of briefing papers, both done, you know, by staff. He would… you know, get
briefed up [by the] State Department, and then he would find out if there was any message or anything that he, that the White House wanted him to carry, as well.

DW: In… what did you observe in his interaction with his colleagues in the informal times… on the plane… in a dinner… what was the social interaction like?

TG: _____ [just a lot of them]. I mean, it was, [it’d be like, you know], a bunch of people sitting down, and you're going to spend a weekend playing tennis. I mean, _____[he’d] basically put a trip together of people who were friends. I mean, you know, you didn't take somebody that you knew was going to be a real stick-in-the-mud. But these were people [that] got along pretty well, Republican and Democrat. And that's how it would play out. I mean, they would… you know, they all got along pretty well. _____ was on the trip, too. That's the other one _____.

DW: Um… if I'm correct, there were three trips in… 1982, and I don't have anything down for 83 and 84, but, a Latin American trip --

TG: Right… went on that one.

DW: Anything distinctive about that?

TG: Not really.

DW: Not really.

TG: Not really.

DW: Um… China?

TG: China, I went on that one. China trip was very interesting. I'm trying to remember if it was the first time… that he had been there, and that you'd have to check, David. I'm not sure, [but] --

DW: I think it was, because he had planned to go… in… 1979 or 1980, and there had been some confusion about the airplane --
TG: Right.

DW: that would be supplied.

TG: [Correct].

DW: And he got his nose out of joint --

TG: Right.

DW: and --

TG: Right.

DW: that trip didn't happen.

TG: Okay. But _____, this one was very interesting, because… it was the first time inside to really sort of… size up the, you know, Chinese officials. He had been to the Soviet Union before, trying to see the differences between, you know, the Communist government in China compared to the Communist government in the Soviet Union. [Moved] around enough in the countries, you get a feel for, you know, different parts of China and how they were reacting to a lot of the economic stimulus that was going on. I think one of the… I remember one of the things that got his attention _____, you know, [he] stayed in one of the State guest houses, and… there were no shower curtains. I mean you stood on this block of wood. And that was a little bit different. But it was… we also, I think I may have told you [this] story before. This is where [we] left the big camera lens on the Great Wall of China.

DW: I don't think so, no.

TG: You know, cause, before we went, he had had, I think _____ a reporter with U.S. News and World Report give him this humongous lens. And then he took it with him. You know, we went up, about half way up the Great Wall of China, and he was shooting some pictures back. And he finished, and of course he took this big lens down, set it down and put on another one. And the Senate photographer was with him, and his role in life was to keep up with the camera gear. [I mean], I had done that before. Ron’s done it before. This time there
was a guy really to do it. And we… finished the Great Wall, we come back, get in the motorcade, and it goes _____ about 3 feet and comes to a screeching halt. _____ this one red-headed guy running, back up the Great Wall. He'd forgotten the camera lens. And that was a fate worse than death. He could do anything but lose the camera equipment. So the whole thing came to a screeching halt, before [we] went back and, did that. We also stopped in… what, in Japan, on that trip, if I'm not mistaken, or is that a separate one? I'm trying --

DW: There were several countries visited on that trip, and I don't have --

TG: We did Hong Kong --

DW: [the itinerary with me].

TG: I think we did Hong Kong, Japan, and, I mean --

DW: China.

TG: and China. But the bulk of it was in China.

DW: Do you recall anything about Senator Baker's meeting with Deng Xiaoping?

TG: Not off the top of my head.

DW: Yah. [Talk] about the Middle Eastern trip, I am guessing that that picture on the wall was taken on that.

TG: No, this picture on the wall was taken, you know, a couple of years ago.

DW: Oh, is that right?

TG: _____, yah. After he was out, [you know], after he was out of the White House. He went over there, you know, doing something _____, you know, for the law firm, as he took that picture there.
DW: It was taken where?

TG: This was taken in Egypt.

DW: In Egypt, yah.

TG: Yah. But it was after he was out of the White House. It [has] been just a couple of years ago.

DW: [All right]. Then there was a, also I think in 1982, a trip to Western Europe: Germany, Brussels --

TG: Right.

DW: Great Britain, and so on.

TG: Right.

DW: Anything special about that one?

TG: No, not really.

DW: Well, it's 6:00 o'clock, now. I'm... in terms of... what I, what, from my point of view, this would be a natural breaking point.

TG: Okay, sure.

DW: And, because the next matter is, has to do with media relations, and so on, which gets us on a different kind of track. So what do you say we... cease and desist at this point.

HS: _____.

TG: _____.

HS: _____.
TG:  ____.